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INTRODUCTION
Every month, Gallup asks Americans an open-ended question: “What
do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?”
From 1993 to 2005, the percentage of Americans who responded with
“immigration” generally hovered around 3%.1 But after steadily
increasing for the last fifteen years, more than 20% of Americans now
regularly identify immigration as their top concern, with a recordbreaking plurality of 27% identifying it as the number one problem in July
2019.2
Few issues divide Americans like immigration. Recent polling shows
Americans are almost equally divided in thirds as to whether the total
number of legal immigrants allowed in the country each year should be
increased, decreased, or kept the same.3 Given such polarized views, it is
unsurprising that for the last three decades the federal government has
been mostly unable to alter the system, even though numerous major and
minor reforms have been put forward by Democratic and Republican
politicians over the years.4
In theory, the United States has a structure in place to deal with such
gridlock: federalism. Federalism “assures a decentralized government
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society;
it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes;
it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it
makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition
for a mobile citizenry.”5 The current U.S. immigration regime—
complicated and intractable at the federal level—would clearly benefit
from the flexibility, engagement, experimentation, and accountability that
1. Jeffrey M. Jones, New High in U.S. Say Immigration Most Important Problem, GALLUP (June
21, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/259103/new-high-say-immigration-important-problem.aspx.
2. Id. For comparison, in the same time period, only about 15% of Americans, on average,
identified the economy as their chief concern. See Most Important Problem, GALLUP (Dec. 2019),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx.
3. Jones, supra note 1.
4. See Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, The U.S. Immigration Debate, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (July 25, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-immigration-debate-0 (summarizing recent
actions and proposals from both the executive and legislative branches to reform the U.S. immigration
system); see also infra notes 13, 35, 42, and 73.
5. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 454 (1991).
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federalism promises.
But in practice, based on long-held beliefs that the immigration powers
are exclusively held by the federal government, the states have mostly
been excluded from immigration decision-making: “Policies pertaining to
the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted
exclusively to Congress. [This] has become about as firmly imbedded in
the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our
government.”6
This Article challenges these assumptions by advocating for an
increased role for the states at the outset of the immigrant admission
process. The authority to issue permanent and temporary visas should be
devolved to the state governments. States would be empowered to adjust
the types of visas that exist, varying their requirements, their lengths, and
their availability. And while the federal government would still set a cap
on the total number of visas available each year,7 states could trade visas
with one another, creating market incentives that, in the long-term, would
provide Congress with tangible, verifiable data regarding the optimal
number of visas to authorize.
Such a system would allow states to become the primary policy drivers
in determining whether the United States should care more about family
reunification or labor market needs or refugee resettlement. States could
create entirely new visas for the graduates of in-state colleges or the
victims of violence abroad. Or states could deploy visas to incentivize
growth in new industries or the redevelopment of struggling regions.
Rather than advocate any particular change in visa durations or types, this
Article contends that a wider diversity of visas throughout the country is
an invaluable end in and of itself.
The traditional view that immigration is a purely federal power should
not be a barrier to this proposal. On the contrary, this Article
demonstrates that delegating immigration powers to the states is both
good policy and entirely consistent with the United States Constitution. 8
While many scholars have examined the intersection of federalism and
immigration policy, very few have ever advocated for states to take the
lead in exercising immigrant admission powers. Instead, most articles
have focused on the role that states should or should not play in enforcing
existing immigration laws.9 Others oppose any state involvement in the
6. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
7. For a brief discussion of whether it would be preferable to abolish visa caps altogether, see
infra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See generally Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008) (discussing the ability of states to control immigration through
states’ traditional police powers over family law and criminal law); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and
Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609 (2012) (arguing that
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immigration arena whatsoever,10 or recognize that although states will
inevitably be involved in immigration policy, the benefits of such
involvement are outweighed by the risks of state-led discrimination or
mistreatment.11
Only one law review note has actively advocated delegating significant
authority over immigrant admissions to the states. That proposal,
however, was limited to employment visas. 12 Similarly, members of
Congress and a few state legislatures have also occasionally floated the
idea of involving states in the visa process, but again, these proposals have
been limited to just a few categories of visas, typically involving
temporary guestworkers.13
states and localities that exercise immigration enforcement powers threaten immigrants’ civil rights);
David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y
81 (2013) (arguing that courts have interpreted federal preemption too broadly in the context of
immigration law, and that greater state involvement in immigration enforcement actions should be
allowed); Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona—Immigrants Out!, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1 (2010) (advocating for the creation of regional, rather than state-based, immigration policies, subject to
federal oversight); Anne B. Chandler, Why is the Policeman Asking for my Visa?, 15 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 209 (2008) (concluding that localities likely have the constitutional right to engage in immigration
enforcement actions); Note, States’ Commandeered Convictions: States Should Get a Veto Over CrimeBased Deportation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2322 (2019) (arguing for an increased role for the states in
preventing resident undocumented immigrants from being deported).
10. See generally Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673 (2011) (arguing that state involvement in immigration law
does not lead to the benefits typically ascribed to state-based policymaking, such as experimentation or
innovation); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001) (arguing that federal immigration powers can
never be constitutionally delegated to the states).
11. See Stella Burch Elias, The Perils and Possibilities of Refugee Federalism, 66 AM. U. L. REV.
353, 402 (2016) (arguing that “nascent attempts at state engagement in refugee- and asylee-related
rulemaking are precarious” and urging courts to recognize “firm constitutional limits that prevent states
from promulgating laws and developing policies designed to exclude refugees”); Cristina M. Rodríguez,
The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 572 (2008) (arguing
that an exclusively federal system “prevents us from harnessing the value of the federal-state-local
dynamic on immigration matters,” while still acknowledging that “efficiency and coherence require
federal control over the formal admissions and removal processes”); Stella Burch Elias, Comprehensive
Immigration Reform(s): Immigration Regulation, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 37, 79-81 (2014) (discussing efforts
in Germany, Australia, and Canada to devolve immigrant admission powers to subfederal actors, and
concluding that any increased role for states in the American system would require that “the federal
government . . . retain[] ultimate responsibility for admissions determinations”).
12. See Davon Collins, Note, Toward a More Federalist Employment-Based Immigration System,
25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 350 (2007) (calling on Congress to “affirmatively decentralize to the states
administrative control over employment-based (EB) immigration decision-making”). A second law
review article has called for an even more narrow delegation, allowing states to experiment with
alternative types of agriculture guestworker visas. See Julia Jagow, Comment, Dairy Farms and H-2A
Harms: How Present Immigration Policy is Hurting Wisconsin and Immigrant Workers, 2019 WIS. L.
REV. 1269 (2019). To be clear, these proposals would represent good first steps. But by limiting the
types of visas available, states would have limited flexibility. This Article, accordingly, seeks a more
expansive decentralization.
13. State Sponsored Visa Pilot Program Act of 2019, H.R. 5174, 116th Cong. (2019); Jagow, supra
note 12, at 1294 (“[T]hirteen different states have considered legislation that would create individual state-
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This Article, by contrast, is a first-of-its-kind proposal to delegate
power over nearly all types of visas, both permanent and temporary, to
the states. Part I begins by reviewing the current immigration regime in
the United States, with an emphasis on its flaws and the need for reform.
Part II lays out a plan to replace the current visa system with one in which
most types of visas are distributed to the states. The states can then
disburse the visas to prospective immigrants as they see fit, or sell their
allotment to other states if they prefer. In Part III, the Article turns to the
ways in which this proposal’s benefits are rooted in the principles of
federalism and the free market. Finally, in Part IV, the Article addresses
potential constitutional concerns and political critiques of the proposal.
I.

THE CURRENT IMMIGRATION SYSTEM AND ITS FLAWS

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
complained that the federal immigration system bears a “striking
resemblance” to “King Minos’s labyrinth in ancient Crete;” its structure
demonstrates “Congress’s ingenuity in passing statutes certain to
accelerate the aging process of judges.”14 Or, to borrow another ancient
metaphor, the immigration system is like the unsolvable Gordian knot.15
It is the unenviable task of this Part to try and untangle this existing
immigration regime, discussing both how it functions currently and
how—in the view of many—it falls short.16

based guest worker programs for foreign workers and/or initiatives for undocumented residents to gain
status through work in industries that traditionally attract guest workers, such as agriculture or the service
industry.”). See also Alex Nowrasteh, Why We Need State-Based Immigration Visas, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Nov.
20,
2019),
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-why-we-need-state-basedimmigration-visas-20191120-2r2u6fcoxzdevkaidm2iifwhye-story.html; David Bier, State-Sponsored
Visas: New Bill Lets States Invite Foreign Workers, Entrepreneurs, and Investors, CATO INST. (May 11,
2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-research-policy-brief/state-sponsored-visas-newbill-lets-states-invite.
14. Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
15. What's Next After an Immigration Deal Goes Bust?, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/What-s-next-after-an-immigration-dealgoes-bust-12501946.php (“For a brief, shining moment it seemed as if Washington was on the verge of
untangling the political Gordian Knot of immigration reform.”); Karen Grigsby Bates, Undocumented
Immigrants in Calif. Will Benefit From New
Laws,
NPR (Oct. 7, 2013),
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/10/07/230183623/undocumented-immigrants-in-califwill-benefit-from-new-laws (“The federal government remains shut down over a budget stalemate, but
California’s Gov. Jerry Brown decided not to wait for Congress to make decisions on the Gordian knot
that is U.S. immigration policy.”).
16. A lengthy article could be (and often has been) devoted to a single critique of a single type of
visa. This Article does not take a normative position on the merits of any of the criticisms it highlights.
Rather, it suggests that devolving the question to the states will allow different parts of the country to
weigh each criticism and experiment with different solutions.
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An Overview

The United States currently issues over 200 different types of visas,17
not including the status offered to asylees or refugees, who are governed
by a separate system.18 Visas come in two varieties: nonimmigrant and
immigrant. Nonimmigrant visas are referred to in this Article as
temporary visas, because they allow foreign nationals to enter the United
States for only limited periods of time and for limited purposes. These
visas can vary in length dramatically. On the low end, for example, the
crewmembers who staff ships and planes may enter the United States for
up to twenty-nine days (D visas) and the fiancés of U.S. citizens may
remain here for ninety days (K visas). At the other extreme, certain
temporary workers may stay in the United States for up to six years (H
visas), while ambassadors, NATO personnel, and foreign representatives
to the United Nations may remain in the United States for as long as their
home government requests (A, C, NATO, and G visas).19
Immigrant visas, by contrast, have no time limit; therefore, this Article
refers to them as permanent visas. The word “visa” technically refers only
to the travel permit stamped into a passport,20 but an immigrant who
receives a permanent visa is also given a Green Card, which makes them
a legal permanent resident (“LPR”).21 As an LPR, they become eligible
for U.S. citizenship after meeting certain time limit and background check
requirements.22 For ease, this Article uses “permanent visa” to refer to

17. 22 C.F.R. § 41.12 (2013); 22 C.F.R. § 42.11 (2014).
18. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1156 (governing immigrant visas) with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159
(governing refugees and asylum seekers).
19. See generally ILONA BRAY & RICHARD LINK, U.S. IMMIGRATION MADE EASY 184, 352-55,
357-61, 394 (NOLO 19th ed. 2019); see also Ilona Bray, How Long Will Your Visa Allow You to Stay?,
NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-long-will-your-us-visa-allow-you-stay.html (last
visited Nov. 11, 2020).
20. Christine Chester & Amanda Cully, Putting a Plug in America’s Brain Drain: A Proposal to
Increase U.S. Retention of Foreign Students Post-Graduation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 385, 388
(2011) (“The term ‘visa’ refers to ‘a travel permit stamped into a [foreign] passport . . . that allows [an]
alien . . . to travel to [and from the United States].’”) (alterations in original).
21. Id.; see also CARLA N. ARGUETA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42048, NUMERICAL LIMITS ON
PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE PER-COUNTRY CEILINGS 1 (2016)
(using the terms “permanent immigrant” and “LPR” interchangeably, and generally discussing the
division of duties between the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security for overseeing
both the visa-issuing process and the Green-Card-issuing process); KATHERINE WITSMAN, OFF. IMMIGR.
STAT., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS 2 (2018) (“Once issued an immigrant
visa, a foreign national may seek admission to the United States and become an LPR when admitted at a
port of entry.”).
22. BRAY & LINK, supra note 19, at 50-51, 167, 170-73. Many of the individuals who become
LPRs already live in the United States at the time they receive a Green Card because they are already in
the country on a temporary visa or as a prospective asylum seeker. For these individuals, the process of
becoming an LPR is referred to as an “adjustment of status.” See Chester & Cully, supra note 20, at 388;
WITSMAN, supra note 21, at 2. The State Department is responsible for issuing and tracking visas issued
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this entire process: the permission to travel to the United States, the LPR
status, and, ultimately, citizenship.
While the sheer number of different types of visas can seem
overwhelming, the vast majority of immigrants to the United States fall
within just a few categories. The following Subparts address in more
detail the number of visas distributed each year and the requirements for
obtaining these visas.
B.

Permanent Visas

1.

Visa Allocations

The federal government uses complex formulas to determine how
many permanent visas to issue each year. In theory, Congress has
authorized 675,000 permanent visas per year. But in practice, the number
is always much higher because certain visa categories are not subject to
any annual caps. The actual number of visas issued each year is typically
about one million.23
More specifically, each year, the United States provides an unlimited
number of permanent visas to the immediate family members of U.S.
citizens (defined as spouses, minor children, and, in some cases, parents),

to potential immigrants who are abroad, while the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for
overseeing adjustments of status that occur internally, making it difficult to track the precise number of
new LPRs each year. See ARGUETA, supra note 21, at 1 (for general information) & at 8 (for a discussion
of inconsistencies between the State Department’s numbers and the Department of Homeland Security’s
numbers). But for this Article’s purposes, the distinction between visas issued abroad and adjustments of
status occurring in the United States is irrelevant, except to note that under the current system, the number
of adjustments of status are included when calculating how many visas are issued each year. So, for
example, although approximately 140,000 permanent employment visas are authorized by law each year
(see 8 U.S.C. § 1151(d)(1)(A)), the State Department reports that only 27,345 such visas were issued in
2018. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2018, TABLE I IMMIGRANT AND
NONIMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED AT FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018 (2018), available
at
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2018AnnualReport/FY18Annual
Report%20-%20TableI.pdf. But separately, the State Department confirmed that the number of visas
combined with the number of adjustments of status equaled 139,483, or roughly the 140,000 authorized
for that year. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2018, TABLE V IMMIGRANT VISAS
ISSUED AND ADJUSTMENTS OF STATUS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS FISCAL YEAR 2018 (2018),
available
at
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2018AnnualReport/FY18Annual
Report%20-%20TableV.pdf. Accordingly, for convenience, this Article uses “permanent visas” to refer
both to visas issued abroad and to adjustments of status issued at home when discussing the annual caps
on visa categories.
23. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(1)(A)(1), (d)(1)(a), (e); see also ARGUETA, supra note 21, at 2. A
more detailed explanation of how visa disbursements are calculated is provided in WILLIAM A. KANDEL,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42866, PERMANENT LEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: POLICY
OVERVIEW 2-7 (2018).
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totaling an average of about 470,000 visas per year.24 It then issues about
226,000 visas to non-immediate relatives, 140,000 visas to employersponsored immigrants, and 55,000 diversity visas to immigrants from
historically underrepresented countries.25
Many of these categories are further subdivided. For example, of the
226,000 family-sponsored visas available, 23,400 are designated for the
unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens; 23,400 are for the married adult
children of U.S. citizens; 114,200 are for the spouses, minor children, and
unmarried adult children of LPRs; and 65,000 are for the siblings of U.S.
citizens.26 Meanwhile, for employer-sponsored immigrants, 40,040 of the
available visas go to immigrants with “extraordinary abilities”; 40,040 are
for professionals with advanced degrees; 40,040 are for skilled or
unskilled workers; 9,940 are for “special immigrants,” such as religious
ministers; and 9,940 are for investors who agree to invest at least one
million dollars in the U.S. economy.27 Finally, diversity visas are
reallocated each year based on the country of origin of immigrants who
have been admitted to the United States over the last five years. “The
formula generally results in the allocation of approximately 24,000
diversity visas for the European region, 20,000 for the African region,
7,000 for the Asian region, 2,500 for the Latin American and Caribbean
region, less than 1,000 to the Oceania region, and 8 to the North American
region.”28
24. The number of immediate relative visas issued each year is not subject to any annual cap, see
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), meaning it fluctuates each year. On average, between 2001 and 2017,
471,807 immediate family members became LPRs each year. U.S. Dep’t HOMELAND SEC., OFF. IMMIGR.
STAT., 2018 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS (Oct. 2019), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook (hereinafter “YEARBOOK”). The numbers ranged
from a low of 331,286 in 2003 to a high of 580,348 in 2006. But 2003 represents a significant aberration—
it is the only year in the period where the number fell below 400,000. Id.
25. These numbers are all set by statute in 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(1)(B)(ii), (d)(1)(a),; & (e). Note
that 226,000 visas per year is the minimum number of non-immediate relative visas allowed. The statue
actually authorizes a maximum of 480,000 for this category each year. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(1)(A)
with 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(1)(B). But visas beyond the minimum amount do not become available unless
the number of immediate-relative visas issued in the same period falls below 254,000. As that has not
occurred since at least 1996, the 226,000 minimum has also effectively become the annual maximum.
YEARBOOK, supra note 24.
26. KANDEL, supra note 23, at 5.
27. Id. Note that while this Article occasionally uses the phrase “unskilled” workers, as is common
in both the academic literature and the law itself, there are reasons to believe the phrase should be retired.
See, e.g., Brittany Bronson, Do We Value Low-Skilled Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/opinion/do-we-value-low-skilled-work.html; Allana Akhtar, A
Tweet from Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Convinced Me I’ve been Using the Wrong Word to Describe
Waitresses. Here’s Why I’ll Never Call Them ‘Unskilled’ Again, BUS. INSIDER (July 28, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/why-unskilled-labor-perpetuates-stereotypes-about-gender-education2019-7.
28. Andowah A. Newton, Note, Injecting Diversity into U.S. Immigration Policy: The Diversity
Visa Program and the Missing Discourse on its Impact on African Immigration to the United States, 38
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1049, 1055 (2005).
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In addition to the above categories, a certain number of refugees and
asylees become LPRs each year.29 “Refugees are admitted to the United
States from abroad while asylees are foreign nationals who request and
receive asylum after having entered the United States. The number of
refugees admitted each year is determined by the President in consultation
with Congress. The number of asylees is not limited.”30 On average,
between 2001 and 2017, 95,000 refugees and 42,000 asylees became
LPRs each year.31
Accordingly, in any given year, the United States may provide
permanent visas as follows: 32
Immediate family member visas
Other family-sponsored visas
Employer-sponsored visas
Diversity visas
Refugees
Asylees
TOTAL:

470,000
226,000
140,000
55,000
95,000
42,000
1,028,000

46%
22%
14%
5%
9%
4%
100%

29. As noted above, refugees and asylees are not generally treated as part of the immigrant visa
regime. But because refugees and asylees are entitled to request LPR and ultimately become U.S. citizens,
they are included here. See supra note 18.
30. See KANDEL, supra note 23, at 3 n.16.
31. See YEARBOOK, supra note 24. This reflects the number receiving LPR status each year, which
is different from the number admitted to the country in a given year, as refugees and asylees must reside
in the United States for one year before becoming LPRs. See WITSMAN, supra note 21, at 4. These
averages are likely to be significantly lower in the coming years, due to both the lower refugee totals
imposed by the Trump Administration for 2018 and 2019 (see, e.g., Bobby Allyn, Trump Administration
Drastically Cuts Number Of Refugees Allowed To Enter the U.S., NPR (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/764839236/trump-administration-drastically-cuts-number-of-refugeesallowed-to-enter-the-u), and its various policies limiting the number of asylees admitted each year (see
Nicole Narea, The Demise of America’s Asylum System Under Trump, Explained, VOX (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/2019/11/5/20947938/asylum-system-trump-demise-mexico-el-salvador-hondurasguatemala-immigration-court-border-ice-cbp). And immigration numbers for all categories are likely to
be significantly lower in 2020 due to the federal government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic. See
Proclamation No. 10,014, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,441 (Apr. 29, 2020); Proclamation No. 10,052, 85 Fed. Reg.
38,263 (June 22, 2020).
32. These figures are necessarily an oversimplification. They represent a hypothetical allocation
based on averages, rather than the raw numbers of any single year. They also only cover the most
numerous permanent visa categories; if smaller visas were included, the percentages would change
slightly. For example, about 20,000 SI and SQ visas were issued in 2017 to Iraqis and Afghans who
cooperated with the United States during its wars in those countries. These represent about 1.5% of the
total number of permanent visas issued that year. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., OFF. IMMIGR. STAT., 2017
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 18-19, TABLE 6. PERSONS OBTAINING LAWFUL PERMANENT
RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND MAJOR CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEARS 2015 TO 2017 (July 2019),
available at https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2017/table6. Incorporating these
relatively small numbers into the above analysis would reduce each of the percentages in the chart by
about 0.25%.
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Many critics argue these allocations are unwise. Perhaps the most
common complaint is that the United States wrongfully prioritizes familybased immigration over employment or merit-based immigration. The
Trump Administration, for example, proposed completely reorienting the
system around employment: instead of allocating approximately 68% of
visas to immediate family members and other relatives, it would have set
aside only 33% for family reunification. Meanwhile, it would have
increased employment-based visas to 57%, removed the diversity visa
entirely, and reduced the number of refugee and asylee LPRs from 13%
combined to 10% combined.33 Notably, the bipartisan comprehensive
immigration reform plan that passed the Senate in 2013 would have led
to a similar, though less dramatic, readjustment from family visas to
employment visas.34
Of course, there are others who advocate for either retaining or
expanding family-centric immigration. For example, recent bills
introduced by congressional Democrats have proposed moving the
immediate relatives of LPRs, who are currently limited to 114,200 visas
per year, to the same category as the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens,
which is not subject to any cap. If this proposal were adopted, the number
of immediate family member visas would increase, while the number of
visas going to other relatives would remain roughly the same because
visas that would have gone to the immediate relatives of LPRs would
instead go to other non-immediate relative categories, such as adult
children and siblings. The result would be a net increase in the number
of family-based visas issued each year, both in terms of raw numbers and
as a percentage of all visas issued.35
33. Yamiche Alcindor, What’s in Trump’s Immigration Proposal, PBS (May 16, 2019),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/whats-in-trumps-immigration-proposal; for an example of
criticisms of this proposal, see John Fritze, Trump Immigration Plan Sidesteps Immigrants Here Illegally,
Draws
Wide
Criticism
From
Both
Sides,
USA
TODAY
(May
16,
2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/05/16/donald-trump-immigration-plan-does-notaddress-illegal-immigration/3692319002/; Julie Grace Brufke, Pelosi: Trump Immigration Plan is ‘Dead
on Arrival,’ THE HILL (May 16, 2019), https://thehill.com/latino/444155-pelosi-trump-immigration-planis-dead-on-arrival.
34. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,
113th Cong. (2013). The bill would have reduced the number of family-sponsored visas from 226,000 to
161,000 (§ 2304) and would have eliminated the diversity visa entirely (§ 2303), while creating between
120,000 and 250,000 new merit-based visas for each year (in addition to the 140,000 employment visas
that already exist), depending on the unemployment rate in the United States (§ 2301). After passing the
Senate, the House of Representatives declined to take up the bill. See Why Immigration Reform Died in
Congress, NBC NEWS (July 1, 2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/why-immigrationreform-died-congress-n145276.
35. See Resolving Extended Limbo for Immigrant Employees and Families Act, S. 2603, 116th
Cong. (2019); Reunited Families Act, H.R. 4944, 115th Cong. (2018). Allowing an unlimited number of
visas for the immediate family members of LPRs was also contemplated by the 2013 Senate reform (see
S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2305 (2013)), but as noted, that bill also would have reduced the number of other
family-sponsored visas available and created more merit-based visas, so it most likely would not have led
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These are just some of the most expansive changes that have been
proposed. Many other smaller proposals have been put forward as well.
Some want to see the percentage of diversity visas increased, even if it
comes at the expense of family-based or employer-based visas.36 Others
argue that the United States should admit more skilled and unskilled
workers, while reducing the number of visas reserved for workers with
“extraordinary” skills or advanced professional degrees.37 And some of
the most contentious debates involve how many refugees the United
States should accept.38
In addition to caps on certain categories of visas, many permanent visas
are also subject to country-of-origin caps. No more than 7% of all familybased visas (excluding the immediate family members of U.S. citizens),
employment-based visas, or diversity visas can go to immigrants from a
single country in any given year. This is typically what Americans think
of when referring to a “waiting list” or “backlog.” to legally enter the
United States.39 For example, as of December 2019, the State Department
was still processing visa requests from the unmarried, adult children of
U.S. citizens that were filed in May 2013 (for Chinese and Indian
nationals), November 2008 (for Filipinos), and August 1997 (for Mexican
applicants).40 Other relatives, such as married children, must wait even
to an overall increase in the percentage of visas going to family members.
36. See Newton, supra note 28, at 1078 (“[A] significantly larger amount of visas should be
allocated to the diversity visa program. This can be accomplished by increasing the total amount of
immigrant visas available or by reallocating some of the visas currently allocated for family and
employment-based visas.”).
37. Kayleigh Scalzo, Note, American Idol: The Domestic and International Implications of
Preferencing the Highly Educated and Highly Skilled in U.S. Immigration Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
926, 943-45 (2011) (criticizing the U.S. preference for highly skilled immigrants over unskilled workers);
Anita Ortiz Maddali, Left Behind: The Dying Principle of Family Reunification Under Immigration Law,
50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 107, 139 (2016) (discussing how the focus on skilled immigrant workers favors
male immigrants over women and children).
38. See David Kampf, Keeping Refugees Out Makes the United States Less Safe, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Sept. 13, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/13/keeping-refugees-out-makes-the-united-statesless-safe/; Stephen Yale-Loehr & Aaron El Sabrout, Make America Great Again: Admit More Refugees
to the U.S., CORNELL L. SCHOOL, https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/spotlights/Make-America-GreatAgain-Admit-More-Refugees-to-the-US.cfm (last visited Mar. 7, 2021); Andrew Vitelli, Should the US
Accept Syrian Refugees, THE PERSPECTIVE (2019), https://www.theperspective.com/debates/politics/usaccept-syrian-refugees/; see also Allyn, supra note 31; Narea, supra note 31; Alcindor, supra note 33.
39. See, e.g., Nicole Nixon, Why ‘Waiting In Line’ For Legal Immigration Status Can Take Years,
KUER 90.1 (Apr. 12, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.kuer.org/post/why-waiting-line-legal-immigrationstatus-can-take-years#stream/0; David Bier, Immigration Wait Times from Quotas Have Doubled: Green
Card Backlogs Are Long, Growing, and Inequitable, CATO INST. (June 18, 2019),
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/immigration-wait-times-quotas-have-doubled-greencard-backlogs-are-long; Adam Barsouk, Illegal Immigrants Jump the Line, Making Legal Immigrants
Wait, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 02, 2019), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/illegalimmigrants-jump-the-line-making-legal-immigrants-wait.
40. Visas
Bulletin,
DEP’T
OF
STATE
(Dec.
2019),
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_december2019.pdf. Note that although
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longer: applications from China go back to 2007; applications from India
go back to 2004; applications from the Philippines go back to 1998; and
applications from Mexico go back to 1996. Meanwhile, for certain
employment categories, the State Department is still processing
applications from 2008 and 2009 for Chinese and Indian workers.41
There have been many calls to raise or eliminate the per-country caps
altogether—even if the total number of visas issued each year remains
unchanged—because these provisions disproportionately affect just a few
countries. In late 2019, a bipartisan proposal to increase the caps from
7% to 15% in some categories, and to remove the caps entirely in other
categories, passed the House of Representatives and appeared likely to
become law. However, at the last moment, the bill failed to advance in
the Senate.42
2.

Visa Requirements

In addition to criticisms about the allocation of visas, there are also
criticisms about the qualifications necessary to obtain certain visas.
For example, “immediate relatives”—the group receiving the most
visas from the United States each year—refers only to “the children,
spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States, except that, in the
case of parents, such citizens shall be at least 21 years of age.”43
Additionally, “children” is defined as an unmarried person under twentyone years of age.44 This means that a minor citizen cannot sponsor their
parent and that the unmarried or married adult children of citizens, the
siblings of citizens, and the spouses, children, and parents of LPRs are all
excluded from the “immediate relative” definition. These potential
immigrants must instead pursue other family-sponsored visas, which have
strict annual caps.45
Perhaps the current definition of immediate relative is reasonable, but
it is not the only reasonable definition. For example, some have argued
that the current definition causes unfair problems for widows whose U.S.the State Department refers to these as “F1” visas in the Visa Bulletin, that designation is not the official
name; rather, they are F11 or B11 visas. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.12 (2013).
41. Visas Bulletin, supra note 40.
42. Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act, H.R. 1044, 116th Cong. (2019); Fairness for HighSkilled Immigrants Act, S. 386, 116th Cong. (2019); Nicole Narea, A Rare Bipartisan Agreement on
Immigration Reform Has Tanked in the Senate, VOX (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/9/19/20873985/bipartisan-immigration-green-card-bill-senate; David Bier, Fairness for
High Skilled Immigrants Act: Wait Times and Green Card Grants, CATO INST. (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.cato.org/blog/fairness-high-skilled-immigrants-act-wait-times-green-card-grants.
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)-(4).
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citizen-spouse dies prematurely.46 Others have argued that minor
children should be allowed to sponsor their parents, which was permitted
until 1976.47 And there have been criticisms about how these definitions
treat same-sex partners,48 women in abusive relationships,49 and
stepfamilies.50 More radically, some argue that the changing definition
of “family” in the modern world requires a wholesale rethinking of the
concept as it applies to immigration law, with child welfare being
prioritized over biological ties.51
Or consider employee visas. Permanent employment visas, like family
visas, are divided into different categories, with more visas available for
those immigrants who qualify for categories that are seen as most
beneficial to the United States’ economy:
First preference is reserved for what are commonly known as “priority
workers,” more specifically, “persons of extraordinary ability in the
sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics; outstanding professors or
researchers; and multinational executives and managers.” Qualification as
a person of extraordinary ability in one of these fields is “demonstrated by
sustained national or international acclaim and . . . achievements [which]
have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation.”
Second preference is given to aliens “who are members of the professions
holding advanced degrees or for persons with exceptional ability in the arts,
sciences, or business.” Under this category, possession of a degree is
evidence of exceptional ability, but is insufficient by itself. The third
preference “is reserved for professionals, skilled workers, and other
workers.” Fourth preference is afforded to “special immigrants,” including

46. See, e.g., Shaina Elias, Note, From Bereavement to Banishment: The Deportation of Surviving
Alien Spouses Under the “Widow Penalty,” 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 172 (2008); Melanie Hui Lipana,
Note, The Reality for Noncitizen Widows, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1493 (2012).
47. See Maddali, supra note 37, at 170-71.
48. See Laura Figueroa & Angelica Jimenez, The Slow, Yet Long-Anticipated Death of DOMA and
its Impact on Immigration Law, 16 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 547 (2014); JonCarlo
Serna, Comment, Same-Sex Bi-National Couples: The Benefits and Pitfalls of Judicial Evolution and the
Validity of Marriage, 17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 591 (2015); Kate Shoemaker,
Comment, Post-Deportation Remedy and Windsor’s Promise, 63 UCLA L. REV. 168 (2016).
49. See Margaret M.R. O’Herron, Note, Ending the Abuse of the Marriage Fraud Act, 7 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 549 (1993); Albertina Antognini, Family Unity Revisited: Divorce, Separation, and Death
in Immigration Law, 66 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing generally the intersection of separation, divorce,
and death with immigration law).
50. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in Federal Law, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 514 (1987).
51. See Shani M. King, U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of Family:
Towards a Functional Definition of Family that Protects Children’s Fundamental Human Rights, 41
COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 509, 510 (2010) (“[E]ven where the United States aims to further family unity,
it fails to do so because U.S. immigration law reflects a legal construction of the ‘family’ concept that is
largely premised on biology, is grounded in the traditional conception of a nuclear family, and excludes
what this Article calls ‘functional’ families: formations which may not satisfy this narrow conception of
family, but satisfy the care-taking needs of children.”). For a similar argument, see Monique Lee
Hawthorne, Comment, Family Unity in Immigration Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 809 (2007).
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“religious workers, employees of U.S. foreign service posts, [and] retired
employees of international organizations.” The fifth and final preference
category is reserved for investors.52

In each instance, an immigrant must meet the standards of the visa
itself; e.g., must have “extraordinary ability” or have an “advanced
degree” or be a “religious worker,” depending on the category for which
they are applying. But those who are part of the second or third preference
must also obtain a labor certification, meaning their employer-to-be must
first file an application with the Department of Labor demonstrating that:
(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified . . . and
available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United
States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or
unskilled labor, and
(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and
working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.53

These labor certifications have been criticized from all sides. Some
argue that it is an unnecessarily burdensome process that ultimately does
little to fulfill its stated purpose—protecting U.S. workers.54 Others, by
contrast, note that the Supreme Court has “often recognized that a
‘primary purpose in restricting immigration is to preserve jobs for
American workers,’”55 and that the labor certification process should be
made more stringent in order to achieve that goal.56
52. Chester & Cully, supra note 20, at 392-93 (citations omitted).
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i)(I)-(II).
54. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1285,
1310-11 (2012) (referring to the current labor requirements as “nonsensical”); Collins, supra note 12, at
358 (“[W]hile protecting American labor and ensuring that foreign labor is turned to only as a last resort
can be seen as a reasonable, even laudable, goal, the system arguably fails even at that. While a rigorous
and cumbersome labor certification system may protect domestic labor by discouraging applications and
artificially keeping admissions below quota . . . , its complexity and susceptibility to employers willing to
game the system fail to protect American workers.”). See also Shang-Tzu (Peter) Hwu, Alien Labor
Certification: A “Shell Game” for United States Workers, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 367 (1991);
Heather L. Brown, Comment, The Paradoxical Nature of the Department of Labor’s Labor Certification
Procedures as Applied to Self-Employed Aliens, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 43 (1993).
55. INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrant Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991).
56. Jessica Shaver, Obama Administration Changes to H-2A Visa Program: A Temporary Fix to
a Permanent Problem, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 97, 98-99 (2009) (summarizing criticisms of Bush
Administration changes to the certification process that were considered insufficiently protective of
American workers); Seth R. Leech & Emma Greenwood, Keeping America Competitive: A Proposal to
Eliminate the Employment-Based Immigrant Visa Quota, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 322, 349-50 (2010)
(warning that certain proposals to “remove[] the element of labor certification” could harm the “domestic
labor force,” and arguing further that the labor certification process is superior to a points-based system
at protecting American workers); Dean Baker, Silicon Valley Needs to Quit Whining About H1-B Visas,
FORTUNE (Feb. 9, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/02/09/h1-b-silicon-valley-tech/ (suggesting, in the
context of temporary visas, that tech companies should only be able to hire foreign workers if they first
show that they have increased the number of African Americans and women working for their firms).
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The fifth permanent employment visa category is the subject of debate
as well. Some have called for the expansion of EB-5 investment visas57
or for the creation of entirely new investor visas,58 while others have
called on Congress to tighten the requirements for investor visas so that
rich foreigners cannot just “buy” American citizenship.59
Finally, no permanent immigrant category has been as controversial in
recent years as the admission of refugees and asylees. One report
criticized the Trump Administration for not only reducing the total
number of refugees, but also for attempting to prioritize religious refugees
while deprioritizing orphans, among other changes.60 There have also
been calls to create new refugee categories, such as for those fleeing
climate change,61 gender-based discrimination,62 or violations of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.63 Similarly, in the asylum
context, the Trump Administration moved to limit those seeking asylum
based on domestic violence or gang violence, which sparked significant
criticism.64

57. Leslie K. L. Thiele & Scott T. Decker, Residence in the United States Through Investment:
Reality or Chimera, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 103, 147-48 (2010).
58. David P. Weber, Halting the Deportation of Businesses: A Pragmatic Paradigm for Dealing
with Success, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 765, 794 (2009).
59. Taylor C. Byrley, Note, Selling Citizenship to the Highest Bidder: A Proposal to Reform the
United States EB-5 Investor Visa Program, 27 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 79 (2017).
60. Kristie de Peña & Matthew La Corte, The Devil is in the Details: Digging Deeper into 2020
Refugee
Resettlement
Changes,
THE
NISKANEN
CTR.
(Nov.
18,
2019),
https://www.niskanencenter.org/the-devil-is-in-the-details-digging-deeper-into-2020-refugeeresettlement-changes/.
61. Ryan Wangman, Ed Markey Wants US to Admit At Least 50,000 Refugees a Year Fleeing
Climate
Change,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(Sept.
27,
2019),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2019/09/27/markey-wants-admit-least-refugees-yearfleeing-climate-change/gIufscMs1k6RLM3zCJPuDJ/story.html; but see Kara K. Moberg, Note,
Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally Displaced Persons Displaces Necessary
Protection, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1131 (2009) (arguing that the current refugee and asylum system is illsuited to deal with climate refugees).
62. Mattie L. Stevens, Note, Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender
as a Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 179 (1993).
63. Michael J. Parrish, Note, Redefining the Refugee: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
as a Basis for Refugee Protection, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 223 (2000).
64. Priscilla Alvarez, DOJ Defends Rule Ending Asylum Protections for Domestic Violence
Victims, CNN (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/09/politics/asylum-protections-domesticviolence-appeals-court/index.html; Emily Moss, Who Is a Refugee, HARV. POL. REV. (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/who-is-a-refugee/; Matt Zapotosky, Judge Strikes Down Trump
Administration Effort to Deny Asylum for Migrants Fleeing Gang Violence, Domestic Abuse, WASH. POST
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/judge-strikes-down-trumpadministration-effort-to-deny-asylum-for-migrants-fleeing-gang-violence-domesticabuse/2018/12/19/61687d00-03b1-11e9-b6a9-0aa5c2fcc9e4_story.html.
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Temporary Visas

The situation with temporary visas is similar. Out of approximately
nine million temporary visas issued in 2018, about 6.7 million were for
tourists or short-term business visits (B visas), and another 300,000 were
for brief entries by airplane and ship crewmembers (C and D visas). 65 Of
the remaining two million temporary visas, about 1.1 million were for
temporary work visas (H, J, or L visas) and another 400,000 were for
students (F and M Visas). The remaining visas went, in decreasing order
of prevalence, to: officials with foreign governments or international
organizations like the United Nations, NATO, and NAFTA (A, G, I,
NAFTA, and NATO visas); persons with “extraordinary” abilities in the
sciences, arts, education, or business, as well as (less extraordinary)
athletes and artists (O and P visas); treaty-specific trade workers (E visas);
the fiancés of U.S. citizens (K visas); religious leaders (R visas); workers
travelling to the Northern Mariana Islands (CW visas), cultural exchange
visitors (Q visas); certain crime victims (U visas); and the victims of
human trafficking (T visas). 66
Like with permanent visas, there are many criticisms leveled against
how temporary visas are allocated and who is eligible. 67 For example,
few issues are as heavily debated as the appropriate number of temporary
work visas. The number of H1-B visas for specialty workers (often used
in the tech industry),68 H2-A visas for temporary agricultural workers, and
65. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2018, TABLE XVI CLASSES OF
NONIMMIGRANTS ISSUED VISAS (INCLUDING BORDER CROSSING CARDS) FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018
(2018),
available
at
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2018AnnualReport/FY18Annual
Report%20-%20TableXVIA.pdf.
66. See supra note 65.
67. Reserving some visas for workers willing to live in the Northern Mariana Islands, a U.S.
territory, represents a unique problem that may or may not fall within this Article’s proposal. On the one
hand, there is no particular reason that U.S. territories could not be treated like states, receiving a share of
visas to distribute as they see fit. On the other hand, given the unique relationship between territories and
the federal government, it would be unsurprising if the federal government insisted on maintaining control
over territory-specific visas.
68. See Roger Waldinger & Christopher L. Erickson, Temporarily Foreign? The Labor Market
for Migrant Professionals in High-Tech at the Peak of the Boom, 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 463 (2003);
Leah Phelps Carpenter, Comment, The Status of H-1B Visa in These Conflicting Times, 10 TULSA J. COMP .
& INT’L L. 553, 578 (2003) (summarizing criticisms of the H-1B visa); Stephen Moore, U.S. Needs More
Brainiac Immigrants, So Let’s Boost H1B Visas, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 19, 2019),
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/04/19/stephen-moore-u-s-needs-more-brainiacimmigrants-so-let-s-boost-h1b-visas/ (calling for more H1-B visas); L. Francis Cissna, New Regulation
Will
Make
H-1B
Visa
Program
More
Effective,
CNN
(Feb.
12,
2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/12/opinions/regulation-will-make-h-1b-program-more-effectivecissna/index.html (calling for H1-B visas to be allocated primarily to graduates of U.S. schools); Michael
Hiltzik, Stephen Moore, Trump’s Pick for the Fed, Just Got a Key Immigration Program Dead Wrong,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-moore-fed-visas20190422-story.html (calling the H1-B program a “cynical sham” because it takes jobs from Americans).
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H2-B visas for unskilled workers are debated year after year. 69 There
have also been calls for stricter minimum wages for guestworkers;70
limiting the number of visas available to tech companies unless they first
make progress in hiring more women and people of color;71 expanding
labor protections for farmworkers;72 and allowing greater flexibility for
temporary workers to switch jobs without having to leave the United
States and start the process over.73
The student visa system is also a subject of discussion. Some advocate
an easier process for international students to apply to U.S. college
programs or for keeping students in the United States, even on a
temporary basis, after they graduate. 74 Others have criticized the system
for imposing barriers that prevent poorer students from participating in
the program.75 But the student visa system has also been attacked for
being exploited by some of the terrorists involved in the September 11,
2001 attacks and for providing an avenue for the theft of U.S. trade
secrets.76 There have also been highly publicized scandals regarding
69. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44849, H-2A AND H-2B TEMPORARY WORKER
VISAS: POLICY AND RELATED ISSUES (2020) (providing a summary of how the H-2A program works and
what policy considerations are involved in determining qualifications for the visa); Bruce Talbott, Our
Fruit is Rotting in the Trees as Laborers are Kept out of the Country, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-fruit-is-rotting-in-the-trees-as-laborers-are-kept-out-ofthe-country/2018/08/24/bf119ad6-a6e6-11e8-8fac-12e98c13528d_story.html (calling for an increase in
the number of temporary agricultural workers allowed each year); Camilla Benoni & Ben Bira, Open
Forum: H-2A Visa Helps Farmers but also Widens Door for Labor Abuses, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Open-Forum-H-2A-visa-helps-farmers-butalso-13789929.php (criticizing the lack of safeguards in the H2-A program); Alex Nowrasteh, Offer More
Visas to People Coming Across the Southern Border, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-offer-more-visas-to-people-coming-across-thesouthern-border-20190820-cxvqjuky5ralnggcteu2b6f2ky-story.html (calling for additional visas to be
allocated to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to stem the flow of illegal border crossings).
70. See Kate Cimini, This Trump Rule Change Will Mean Lower Wages for Farmworkers, CAL
MATTERS (Oct. 16, 2019), https://calmatters.org/california-divide/2019/10/this-trump-rule-change-willmean-lower-wages-for-farmworkers/.
71. Baker, supra note 56.
72. See Alison K. Guernsey, Note, Double Denial: How Both the DOL and Organized Labor Fair
Domestic Agricultural Workers in the Face of H-2A, 93 IOWA L. REV. 277 (2007).
73. See Charles C. Mathes, Note, The Department of Labor’s Changing Policies Toward the H2B Temporary Worker Program: Primarily for the Benefit of Nobody, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1801 (2012)
(calling for visa portability for temporary workers); see also Agricultural Guestworker Act, H.R. 4092,
115th Cong. (2018); Farm Workforce Modernization Act, H.R. 5038, 116th Cong. (2019).
74. See Marnette Federis, Visa Rules are Restricting the Future of International Students in the
US, PRI (June 20, 2019), https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-06-20/visa-rules-are-restricting-futureinternational-students-us; Alia Wong, Colleges Face Growing International Student-Visa Issues, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/09/how-harvard-andother-colleges-grapple-student-visa-problems/597409/; Chester, supra note 20.
75. See Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policies: Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37
HOW. L.J. 237, 257-58 (1994).
76. See Erin N. Grubbs, Academic Espionage: Striking the Balance Between Open and
Collaborative Universities and Protecting National Security, 20 N.C. J. L. & TECH. ON. 235 (2019);
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diploma mills used to help foreign students illegitimately enter the
country, as well as fake schools established by the United States itself to
ensnare foreign students in fraud claims. 77
In fact, virtually every temporary visa category comes with criticisms
or proposed reforms, including fiancé visas,78 athlete and artist visas,79
and religious worker visas.80
Accordingly, as with permanent visas, there are more proposals for
changes to the temporary visa system than Congress can plausibly debate,
let alone enact.81 The purpose of this Article is not to endorse or oppose
any of these proposals. Rather, the goal is to emphasize that our current
system has proven ill-equipped to address any of these complaints,
whatever normative position one takes on them, and that a change to a
state-based system would at least plausibly provide an opportunity to
experiment with some of these ideas.
II.

THE PROPOSAL

What if most immigrant admissions decisions—what types of visas to
issue, what requirements to impose for each visa, and how to allocate
visas among different groups of applicants—were instead made by the
individual states? While King Minos’s labyrinth and the Gordian knot
are useful allegories to express that something is a complicated or
impenetrable problem, the moral of each story is actually that the simplest
Topher Greene, Note, The Importance of Improving U.S. Immigration Law and the Changes Made Since
9-11, 4 REGENT J. INT’L L. 101, 120 (2006).
77. See Christopher S. Collins & T. Richmond McPherson, III, How Tri-Valley University Fell Off
the Diploma Mill: Student Immigration and Façade Education, 38 J.C. & U.L. 525 (2012); Elizabeth
Redden,
A
Fake
University,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED
(Dec.
10,
2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/12/10/who-went-fake-university-farmington-and-why.
78. See Christina L. Pollard, Here Come Many More Mail-Order Brides: Why IMBRA Fails
Women Escaping the Russian Federation, 46 CAP. U. L. REV. 609 (2018) (calling for greater restrictions
on fiancé visas to prevent mail-order bride abuses); Ivan A. Pavlenko, Note, Statutory Purpose and
Deferring to Agency Interpretations of Laws: The Immigrant Law Paradigm: Aged Out, 63 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 147 (2012) (discussing the challenges faced by minor children who seek to accompany parents who
have received a fiancé visas).
79. See Kevin K. McCormick, Note, Extraordinary Ability and the English Premier League: The
Immigration, Adjudication, and Place of Alien Athletes in American and English Society, 39 VAL. U. L.
REV. 541 (2004); Heather E. Morrow, Comment, The Wide World of Sports is Getting Wider: A Look at
Drafting Foreign Players into U.S. Professional Sports, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 649 (2004); Marissa Crespo,
The Final Curtain Call: Administrative Challenges in the United States O-Visa Process for Foreign
Artists and Performers, 36 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 101 (2012); Scalzo, supra note 37.
80. See Greene, supra note 76 (arguing that the religious worker visa is susceptible to fraud by
would-be terrorists); Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Immigration Reform, 35 CATH. LAW. 259, 267 (1994)
(questioning whether religious worker visas could be used to hire employees for private hospitals or
parochial schools).
81. For examples of states innovating in areas where Congress has declined to legislate, see infra
note 113.
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solution is often the best way through the morass.82 Although there may
be no easy answer to all that ails the United States’ immigration system,
devolving a portion of the federal government’s immigration powers to
the states is at least one plausible solution that could cut through the
inertia. This Part lays out the details of how this proposal would work in
practice and provides examples of the likely benefits of such a radically
different system.
A.

Permanent Visas

The proposal is relatively straightforward. Congress would establish a
set number of permanent immigrant visas to be issued each year and
would then allocate a share of those visas to each state, to distribute, trade,
or let expire as that state pleases.
This Article does not take a position on the exact formula to be used
for the initial distribution among the states. Each state could start with
the same amount, or it could be based on population, state GDP,
immigration history, or some other calculation.83 The precise formula is
not important because, under this proposal, no matter how the visas are
initially distributed, they will end up in the right place. So long as states
have the right to sell their visas to one another, the states with the greatest
need or desire for visas will ultimately get them. 84
82. In the former myth, Theseus escaped the labyrinth by unraveling a ball of thread as he walked,
allowing him to later retrace his steps out. Jennifer Welch, Comment, Defending Against Deportation:
Equipping Public Defenders to Represent Noncitizens Effectively, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 564 n.130
(2004). In the latter myth, “Alexander the Great . . ., frustrated with his inability to untangle the knot,
simply sliced through it with his sword.” Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit
Bias in Jury Selection, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 151 n.3 (2010).
83. The pilot program for employment visas proposed by Rep. John Curtis, for example, would
give each state a base of 5,000 visas, while dividing an additional 245,000 visas among the states based
on total population. See Bier, supra note 13. Davon Collins’ employment devolution proposal, by
contrast, suggests distributing the visas based on either population or past immigration levels. See Collins,
supra note 12, at 361 (“A system of initial visa distribution based on population would disadvantage states
that currently receive a disproportionate share of immigrants, such as California. However, the precise
manner of distribution is not critical to the proposal, as long as the system is widely considered to be fair
and equitable. (Thus, another option could be to base distribution on past immigration levels.)”).
84. This is, essentially, a restatement of the Coase theorem, which has been described as “the
single greatest intellectual event in the modern law & economics movement.” Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 782 (1989-90). Stated briefly:
[T]he Coase theorem admits of no singular definition . . . If one can, however, speak of a “typical”
statement of the Coase theorem, it might go something like this: If transaction costs are zero and
property rights over the relevant resources are well-defined, parties involved in an externality
situation will bargain to an efficient and invariant resolution, regardless of to whom the property
rights are initially assigned. So stated, the theorem embodies two assumptions and two
conclusions. The theorem embodies the assumptions that property rights are well defined and the
costs of transacting are zero. The conclusions that emerge are that the resulting allocation of
resources will be efficient and that this result will be invariant across alternative assignments of
rights.
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Once the initial allocation is made, the states would be free to
determine how to distribute those visas. One state could prioritize family
reunification, another could prioritize employment, a third could
prioritize diversity visas, and a fourth could prioritize refugees. Perhaps
even more radically, the states could change the requirements for the visas
altogether. Assume, for example, that State A, State B, and State C all
want to continue issuing visas in roughly the same ratio as they are issued
now, meaning that about 50% of all permanent visas go to the immediate
family members of U.S. citizens. State A could change the definition of
“immediate relative” to include a broader range of family members, such
as the parents of minor citizens or a citizen’s married or unmarried adult
children. State B could expand the definition to include the immediate
relatives of LPRs. Meanwhile, State C could expand the definition of
immediate relative to encompass those who fall outside the historical
model of nuclear families: unmarried partners, widows and widowers,
stepfamily members, or women who would have been eligible for a visa
but for a divorce necessitated by domestic violence.
Similar possibilities exist in the employment context. One state could
abolish the requirement that businesses try to hire an American before
making a job offer to a foreign worker based on a belief that doing so
would create a fairer, more open, and more competitive labor market.
Another state could do the opposite—out of a desire to prevent
immigrants from undercutting American labor, it could require that
businesses pay exorbitant fees to get employee visas or mandate a
significant salary and benefits package to any foreign worker, thereby
incentivizing the hiring of Americans. Or, to be even more aggressive,
one state could designate a certain number of visas to a specific industry
to try and lure businesses from another state. Nevada, for example, could
set aside a certain number of employment visas for new corporations, as
part of its ongoing effort to lure corporations away from Delaware;
Steven G. Medema, Juris Prudence: Calabresi’s Uneasy Relationship with the Coase Theorem, 77 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 66 (2014). Of course, the Coase theorem is not without its critics. See, e.g.,
Hovenkamp, supra, at 786 nn.11 & 12; see also Daniel Q. Posin, The Coase Theorem: Through a Glass
Darkly, 61 TENN. L. REV. 797 (1994). While the Coase theorem suggests that it does not really matter
how visas are initially distributed, so long as the property right—the right to buy or sell visas—is clearly
defined, the best starting point for the allocation of visas would likely be past immigration levels. This
would allow Congress to estimate, as closely as possible, each state’s potential need or desire for
immigrants. Any proposal that veers too far from such an allocation would cause an economic windfall
to the states with more limited interests in immigration. For example, if 10% of all new immigrants from
the last five years settled in State A, and 0.5% of all new immigrants settled in State B, it would make
little sense to allocate the same number of visas to each of these states. Otherwise, State A would have
essentially no choice but to purchase visas from other states just to match the immigration levels it enjoyed
before the decentralization of the visa program. For more information about the intersection between the
ability of states to purchase or sell visas and the likely distribution of immigrants throughout the United
States, see infra Part IV(B)(1)-(2).
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Georgia could provide visas for the film industry, as part of its ongoing
competition with Hollywood.85
States could also move certain visas from the temporary category to the
permanent category. For example, in 1999, Congress created a specific
guestworker visa for nurses, but imposed so many limits on who could
apply and how many visas could be issued that, as a practical matter, only
a handful of new nurses were admitted to the United States.86 In a Note
calling for states to be in charge of such visas, Davon Collins persuasively
argued that if employment visa determinations were made at the state
level, states like Florida, “with large, growing populations of retirees”
could “decid[e] that recruiting nurses was a long-term goal” and could
prioritize providing permanent visas to “the global supply of willing
immigrant nurses and trainees.”87
Other states could create entirely new permanent visas. One state could
provide a temporary visa to students attending in-state colleges, with a
promise that a permanent visa would automatically be available upon
graduation. Other states could harness immigration incentives to combat
rural flight by promising a permanent immigration visa to those who agree
to live or work for a certain number of years in an economically depressed
region.88
Perhaps most importantly, under this proposal, the burden would fall
on the states, rather than the federal government, to address the ongoing
limbo of undocumented immigrants already in the United States. It would
be up to the states to finally decide whether it is more important to admit
new immigrants or to provide permanent visas (with the associated
benefits of LPR status and, eventually, citizenship) to undocumented
immigrants already here. One state could provide visas only to the
undocumented immigrants known as “Dreamers,” meaning young
immigrants who were illegally brought into the United States when they
were minors.89 Another could allocate some or all of its permanent visas
to undocumented immigrants who have lived in the state for one, two, or
five years in an effort, however slow, to provide stability and status for

85. See J. Weston Phippen, Nevada, a Tax Haven for Only $174, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 6, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/04/panama-papers-nevada/476994/;
Eliana
Dockterman, How Georgia Became the Hollywood of the South, TIME (July 26, 2018),
https://time.com/longform/hollywood-in-georgia/.
86. See Collins, supra note 12, at 376-77.
87. Id.
88. For more on this type of proposal, see Silva Mathema, Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, & Anneliese
Hermann, Revival and Opportunity, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 2, 2018),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/09/02/455269/revival-andopportunity/.
89. See Joanna Walters, What is Daca and Who are the Dreamers?, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 14,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/04/donald-trump-what-is-daca-dreamers.
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undocumented immigrants. Or perhaps no state would support any type
of pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, in which case—
if nothing else—we would better understand our real priorities as a
nation.90
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. On the contrary, the benefit of
devolving immigrant admission decisions to the states is that each state
could pursue its own priorities and innovate to determine what works best
for them. Any number of proposals—not just the above—could be tried
by states who have the political will or economic need to do so.
B.

Temporary Visas

This Article’s proposal for temporary visas is essentially identical to its
proposal for permanent visas, with one important difference relating to
duration. Temporary visas, as they currently exist, vary dramatically in
terms of length. In the guestworker context, H1-B visas have a three-year
term, with a possible extension to six years; H1-C visas have a three-year
term with no possibility of extension; and H2-A and H2-B visas have a
one-year term, with a possible extension to three years. Meanwhile,
academic exchange programs—J visas—last anywhere from six months
to five years, depending on the program. And athletes under a P visa have
a ten-year maximum, while artists under the same visa have no
maximum.91
Because of these variations, it would be difficult for the federal
government to simply give states a set number of temporary visas to hand
out. One main goal of federalism is increased flexibility, which means
states need to have the discretion to change the amount of time available
for certain visas. One state may want to give fiancés a year-long visa;
others may want to cap student visas at four years or six years. But if a
state were simply given 1,000 temporary visas and told to allocate them
as it wished, a state could turn all 1,000 visas into ninety-nine-year-long
“temporary” visas, effectively cheating the system and expanding its pool
of permanent visas.92
This Article’s solution is to allocate to the states not a specific number
of visas, but a specific number of months. Suppose, for example, that
State A and State B were each given 1,000 months to be distributed

90. See infra Part IV(B)(3).
91. See supra note 19.
92. Of course, allowing states to pursue this option would still provide Congress with useful
information about the states’ needs or desires for more permanent immigrants. Accordingly, while ways
to avoid this outcome are discussed next, a proposal that allowed states to have this much flexibility could
also be workable.
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through any number of temporary visas.93 State A could take just under
half of those months (480) and divvy them up into four-year visas for
students (e.g., it would issue ten visas lasting forty-eight months each).
State A could then take most of the remaining months—504, to be
specific—and divvy them up into three-year visas for temporary workers
(e.g., it would issue fourteen visas lasting thirty-six months each). The
remaining sixteen months could then be distributed for shorter durations,
such as for foreign professors seeking to teach for a single semester, or
they could be sold to other states.
State B, by contrast, could decide that no temporary visa, regardless of
category, should last longer than twelve months. It could issue eightythree visas, each lasting twelve months. Students who want to continue
their education or workers who want to remain at their jobs would then
have to reapply each year to get an additional twelve-month visa. In this
hypothetical, State B would be left with four extra months, which could
be sold or used for other limited purposes.
Aside from this distinction—giving the states months rather than
visas—the proposal for temporary visas is the same as the proposal for
permanent visas. States could use trial and error to determine how many
temporary farmworkers they need versus how many temporary
technology workers. They could adjust or abolish rules that limit
guestworkers from working for multiple employers, allowing greater
flexibility for immigrants to stay in the United States while seeking new
jobs. They could expand or restrict what programs qualify for student
visas. In short, our immigration system would become much more
responsive to the needs of individual states and the political desires of
local communities.
C.

Other Practical Considerations

This Subpart briefly addresses certain practical questions that could, at
least potentially, impede implementation of the proposal for a statecontrolled immigration system.
1. What Role Would the Federal Government Continue to Play in
this System?
While the stated goal of this Article is to delegate as much power as
possible to the states with respect to immigrant admissions, there would
clearly need to be a continued role for the federal government in several

93. Again, the actual number of months to be allocated is up for debate, but would ideally be linked
to the number of temporary visa holders previously residing in the state. See supra notes 83-84.
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areas. This Subpart examines the distribution of certain duties between
the federal government and the states.
i. Background Checks
At present, the federal government has certain standards that apply to
all visa applicants: they must pass a Department of Homeland Security
background check that reviews things like whether they have committed
any crimes, whether they are likely to spread any dangerous diseases, or
whether they have ever been affiliated with terrorist organizations.94 This
inquiry, which is closely related to the safety and security of the United
States writ large, could continue to be undertaken by the federal
government.95
But it also currently falls to the federal government to ensure that each
applicant meets the requirements of their particular visa. The federal
government examines, for example, whether employers have completed
the labor certification process, whether a marriage is legitimate, and
whether a person meets the definition of a refugee. Going forward, these
determinations should instead be made by the states. Once a state decides
that someone meets the qualifications it has set for a visa, the federal
government would honor that choice, issuing whatever temporary visa or
permanent visa—with its concomitant LPR status and eventual right to
citizenship—the state requests, rather than conduct its own independent
investigation into whether the immigrant has satisfied the relevant visa
requirements.
ii. Control over Certain Types of Visas
Second, some visa categories would necessarily need to stay within the
control of the federal government. Most obviously, the requirements for
obtaining a tourist visa are deeply entangled with foreign policy, with
different requirements existing for citizens of different countries.96 And
even without those foreign policy hurdles, it would be exceedingly

94. See BRAY & LINK, supra note 19, at 50-51, 167, 170-73.
95. Under the current system, those who fail their background check may still be entitled to a
waiver in some instances. See BRAY & LINK, supra note 19, at 34-35, 62-63. Purely in terms of what is
most politically palatable, it would make sense under this proposal to continue reserving to the federal
government the power to issue such waivers. But it would also be possible to create a system where the
federal government simply informs the sponsoring state of any background check problems, and then lets
the state decide whether a waiver is appropriate.
96. At present, 39 countries participate in the Visa Waiver Program, which allows tourists from
those nations to travel to the United States without a visa. See Visa Waiver Program, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/tourism-visit/visa-waiver-program.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2021).
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burdensome for an individual from Sweden hoping to visit the Grand
Canyon, Las Vegas, and Disneyland all in one trip to obtain a tourist visa
from Arizona, Nevada, and California, respectively. Visas for foreign
officials, ambassadors, trade representatives, and sea and air
crewmembers are, like tourist visas, so entangled with foreign policy and
international bureaucracy that state involvement would be a hindrance,
rather than a benefit. Those visas should continue to be administered by
the federal government.
Another category of immigrants that is particularly difficult to
incorporate into this system is asylum seekers. Because asylees must first
enter the United States before seeking relief (as opposed to refugees, who
are vetted abroad before receiving a visa),97 devolving asylum decisions
to the states would impose a significant burden on states along the
Mexican border, where most asylees arrive,98 as these states would be
under significant pressure to allocate a portion of their visas to asylees,
while other states would feel no pressure to do so.
To resolve this problem, the federal government should continue to
maintain responsibility for overseeing asylum requests. After all, under
this proposal, nothing would change regarding the role of Customs and
Border Protection in managing the United States’ ports of entry. And as
discussed in the next Subpart, enforcement—including removal
proceedings through the Department of Justice’s immigration courts—
would also remain the same. It would therefore make sense that when
asylees present themselves to United States officials, the federal
government would be responsible for determining whether the individuals
are allowed to remain.
Importantly, creating this carve out for asylum seekers would not
prevent states from implementing their own, more generous visa
programs for the same category of individuals. For example, the Trump
Administration was heavily criticized for barring victims of domestic
violence or gang violence from obtaining asylum. 99 Under this Article’s
proposal, although the federal government would still be primarily
97. KANDEL, supra note 23, at 3.
98. Asylum requests may be made either affirmatively or defensively. Affirmative asylum requests
occur when asylees voluntarily submit applications directly to asylum officials. Defensive asylum requests
occur when undocumented aliens are placed in removal proceedings and make an asylum request for the
first time as a defense to that process. See NADWA MOSSAD, OFF. IMMIGR. STAT. ANNUAL FLOW REPORT:
REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2018 5 (Oct. 2019). In 2018, a total of 105,500 affirmative asylum applications
were filed with the Department of Homeland Security. Id. at 6. Of these 92,959—or 88%—were made at
the U.S./Mexican border. See Claims of Fear, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/claims-fear. Data showing the origins of
aliens making defensive asylum claims is unavailable, but is presumably less concentrated in the border
states, because such claims are made by individuals who have been in the United States for a longer period
of time.
99. See supra note 64.
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responsible for asylum claims, a state that believed victims of domestic
violence or gang violence should receive protection could counteract
unpopular federal restrictions by setting aside some of its own visas for
such immigrants. In short, keeping the federal government involved
ensures that no single state is burdened with asylum requests due to events
beyond their control—namely their geography—while still providing
states the freedom to embrace additional asylees, beyond the number
admitted by the federal government, if their legislatures choose to do so.
2. Would States Have to be Responsible for Enforcement?
In discussions about devolving immigration powers to the states, the
most controversial issue is typically the ability of states to enforce federal
immigration laws. While few law review articles have addressed whether
states could take a more active role in immigrant selection,100 many have
debated the normative merits and constitutional questions around state
involvement in immigration enforcement, up to and including
deportation.101
Interrogating all the issues that arise in the context of sub-federal
immigration enforcement is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it
to say, for those wary of state-based enforcement—a position this Author
shares—there is no apparent reason why devolving admission powers
would also require devolving enforcement powers. Under this proposal,
the actual visas would still be issued by the State Department; it would
simply be up to the states to decide who qualified for those visas.
Additionally, all visa recipients would still be required to submit to a
federal background check. In other words, the federal government would
have roughly the same information it already has—the identities of
immigrants with visas and information about the length and terms of those
visas. It is true that, under this proposal, the federal government would
need to remain apprised of the visa requirements imposed by the states to
determine whether an immigrant no longer qualifies for a previously
issued visa. But as discussed in more detail below, the federal
government already engages in such work under the current system.102
In sum, the federal government would effectively be in the same
position it currently holds with respect to enforcement, so there would be
no need to permit (or mandate) state-based enforcement of immigration
policy beyond the status quo. Legitimate concerns raised by other
scholars about state-based enforcement should not be a barrier to
100. See supra notes 11-12.
101. See supra notes 9-10.
102. See text accompanying infra notes 160-164 (discussing the many ways in which state laws—
such as family or criminal law—impact whether individuals may be deported).
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embracing state-based admissions policies.
3. What Would Happen to Immigrants Currently on the Waitlist?
Finally, perhaps the most significant practical challenge to
implementing this proposal is determining what to do with immigrants
currently on visa waitlists. As discussed above, immigrants from some
countries have been on these waitlists since the late 1990s. By one
estimate, if nothing is done, some 675,000 immigrants-to-be will die
before their application is processed.103
There may be no legal impediment to simply starting the system over
from scratch and ignoring those who have waited so long. But pretending
the waitlist never existed and forcing every applicant on the list to start
over would be exceedingly unfair. There are no easy solutions to this
issue, but three imperfect ways of handling the waitlist are identified
below.
First, the simplest solution would be to clear the entire waitlist by
temporarily (and dramatically) increasing the number of visas available
for a period of approximately five years.104 Afterward, it would be up to
the states to either craft systems that make waitlists unnecessary (by, for
example, removing per-country caps) or administering their own
waitlists.
The second solution is a slower version of the above, except that it does
not require a dramatic increase in immigration. A certain number of
existing visas could be set aside for the federal government to continue
issuing each year. The sole purpose of these visas would be to eliminate
the waitlist. Depending on how it is structured, how many visas remain
in federal control, and how many individuals abandon the waitlist in favor
of applying instead for new visas made available by the states, the waitlist
could theoretically be exhausted within about eight years.105 The problem
here, however, is that without increasing the total number of visas, fewer
103. See Bier, supra note 39.
104. That was essentially how the problem would have been dealt with in the Senate’s 2013
comprehensive reform bill.
See, Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration
Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2302(c)-(e) (2013); see also A Guide to S.744: Understanding
the 2013 Senate Immigration Bill, AM . IMMIGR . COUNCIL (July 10, 2013),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/guide-s744-understanding-2013-senateimmigration-bill.
105. Simply removing per-country caps without otherwise increasing the number of visas available
is estimated to eliminate the waitlist in eight to ten years. See Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act,
H.R. 1044, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Stuart Anderson, Bill Aims to End Decades-Long Waits for HighSkilled
Immigrants,
FORBES
(Feb.
15,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2019/02/15/bill-aims-to-end-decades-long-waits-for-highskilled-immigrants/#2edd8de77b85 (explaining that this bill would end the employee visa backlog about
five years after an initial three-year transition period).
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visas would be available to allocate to the states, limiting states’ flexibility
to create their own programs.
Finally, and perhaps most realistically, the federal government could
simply abandon the waitlist while mandating that any immigrant on the
list who files a new application for a state visa obtain priority.
Consider, for example, an unmarried Mexican adult who applied to be
reunited with their U.S. citizen parents in 2000. As of December 2019,
the State Department was reviewing applications for Mexican nationals
in that category from 1997,106 so our hypothetical immigrant is close to
finally getting a visa after more than twenty years on the waiting list. But
if the reforms proposed in this Article had been enacted on January 1,
2020, they would have to start all over in their family’s state of residence.
The federal government could nevertheless mandate that their prior
position on the waitlist be taken into account when they apply again. If
State A, where the citizen-parents live, decides to issue only employmentbased visas, our hypothetical immigrant is simply out of luck. The best
option would be for the parents to move to another state with a more profamily visa program.107 So the parents move to State B, which allocates
a significant portion of its visas to family reunification, but continues to
adhere to the 7% per country cap that currently exists under federal law.
The immigrant would be free to submit an application in State B, and
State B would be required to put that application ahead of most other
applicants. But if enough other prospective immigrants from Mexico
with long-delayed applications also applied in that state, the 7% rule
could delay for another year or two when the application would be
granted. So the parents instead move to State C, which is eager to provide
family-based visas and has no per-country cap. If the immigrant
submitted their application in State C, that state would be required to treat
that application as having been filed before nearly all other visas, and they
would finally be permitted to come to the United States.
This system would not be perfect. An immigrant about to get off the
federal waiting list would almost certainly feel robbed if they had to start
over again at the state level—especially if, depending on the regime
created by each state, their opportunity to immigrate decreases. But it is
worth noting that such a risk already exists under the status quo: a
sponsoring relative could die prematurely or a prospective employer

106. See Visa Bulletin, supra note 40.
107. While this would be a major inconvenience, both for the waiting immigrant and for their
parents, it is also—at least theoretically—how federalism is supposed to work. The idea that individuals
can “vote with their feet” is a well-established principle of federalism. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 458 (1991) (noting that federalism “makes government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry”). Accordingly, this may actually be a benefit of the proposal, as it
forces states to compete for the support of citizens with divergent views on the ideal immigration scheme.
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could go bankrupt, making a pending immigration application moot, no
matter how long the immigrant had been on the waiting list.108 At least
this option would provide some measure of opportunity to waiting
applicants.
Even if this Article has no perfect solution to the waitlist, it is still
superior to keeping the current system. The primary cause of the waitlist
is the per-country caps, which Congress, despite occasional proposals, has
been unable to repeal.109 But it is likely that at least some states,
depending on their needs, would eliminate this cap if they had the power
to do so. Therefore, while this is admittedly a thorny issue, this Article’s
proposal would still allow some states to enact a partial fix.
III. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PROPOSAL
Even though this Article’s proposal would represent a radical change
in U.S. immigration law, it is based on concepts long embraced by the
United States: federalism and a free market.
First, this proposal embodies many of the benefits historically ascribed
to our federalist system of government. It would, for example, allow “the
states and the nation to remould, through experimentation, . . . our
economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic
needs,” turning states into the laboratories of democracy once envisioned
by Justice Brandeis.110 And it creates greater accountability by moving
decision-making powers to a more local level:
The . . . major advantage of federalism lies in the ability of state and local
governments to draw citizens into the political process. The greater
accessibility and smaller scale of local government allows individuals to
participate actively in governmental decisionmaking. This participation, in
turn, provides myriad benefits: it trains citizens in the techniques of
democracy, fosters accountability among elected representatives, and
enhances voter confidence in the democratic process.111

This increased activity at the local level is generally characterized as a

108. Immigration officials have some discretion to consider an immigration application even after
the death of a sponsoring family member, but this applies to only a few types of applicants. See Antognini,
supra note 49, at 37-42. Additionally, the American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act of 2000
increased the portability of certain employment visas, meaning that there are some protections for
immigrants that lose a job while on the waiting list, but even those protections are only available if the
immigrant is first able to obtain a new job offer. See Kristen Ness Ayers & Scott D. Syfert, U.S. Visa
Options and Strategies for the Information Technology Industry, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 301,
325-36, 330-31 (2001).
109. H.R. 4944, 115th Cong. (2018).
110. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
111. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 78 (1988) (internal citations omitted).
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good in and of itself—a way to enhance our democracy. Less charitably,
and more cynically, moving power to states and local governments may
insulate the federal government from the worst impulses of antiimmigrant constituents. After all, limiting such sentiment to the state
level might be preferable to allowing anti-immigrant sentiment to flourish
at the federal level:
Federalism can also function as a steam-valve. In the immigration context,
[Professor] Spiro has described this steam-valve effect as the capacity of
‘those states harboring intense anti-alien sentiment to act on those
sentiments at the state level, thus diminishing any interest on their part to
seek national legislation to similarly restrictionist ends.’ The absence of
such a steam-valve in the immigration arena has been thought by some to
be a contributing factor to the flashes of anti-immigration legislation at the
national level, such as those that prompted the Chinese Exclusion Act.
Presumably, areas with high anti-immigrant sentiment are unable to affect
change at the local level, and thus forced to seek immigration restrictions
in Congress. And due to the nature of political logrolling, a small interest
group with an intense preference pitted against the neutral posture of other,
larger groups may prevail in the legislature.112

Finally, as discussed at length above, there is no shortage of ideas
regarding how the United States could restructure its immigration system,
but it is incredibly rare for such changes to actually be adopted. Giving
power to the states increases the likelihood of at least some of these
proposals being implemented.113
Just as importantly, this Article’s proposal calls for visas to be traded
among the states. Therefore, in addition to all the other benefits of
federalism, the proposal would bring market pressure to bear on the
immigration system.114
112. Collins, supra note 12, at 386 (quoting Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration
Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1637-38 (1994)).
113. Merritt, supra note 111, at 6 (“[S]tate and local governments check federal authority by
regulating areas that the federal government chooses to ignore. When President Reagan vetoed a bill
designed to alleviate the high rate of unemployment among American youth, cities and states around the
country created more than thirty programs to employ teenagers in productive tasks. Similarly, when the
federal Food and Drug Administration refused to require fast-food chains to label their ingredients, New
York and several other states compelled the chains to disclose that information. And, although both the
Department of Justice and the United States Commission on Civil Rights have rejected the concept of
comparable worth, at least five states have adopted comparable-worth legislation and twenty-four others
have shown interest in the idea.”) (internal citations omitted).
114. Many argue that this kind of market competition is at the heart of federalism: “The model of
competitive federalism, for instance, asserts that the core substance of ‘American federalism’ is the
protection of markets. . . . Adherents believe that ‘by harnessing competition among jurisdictions,
federalism secures in the political arena the advantages of economic markets—consumer choice and
satisfaction, innovation, superior products at lower prices.’” Christian B. Sundquist, Positive Education
Federalism: The Promise of Equality After The Every Student Succeeds Act, 68 MERCER L. REV. 351, 359
(2017) (quoting MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN 18-
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While the fact that our immigration system has become a quagmire is
primarily a political failure, it could also be characterized as a market
failure. The very existence of millions of undocumented immigrants in
the United States, and of millions of potential immigrants on waiting lists
hoping to immigrate legally,115 suggests problems with the supply and
demand of accessible visas. In other words, the current system is
suffering from an economically inefficient design.
Economic inefficiency has been cited as major argument in favor of a
completely open-borders policy, at least in the employment context:
The [visa] backlog exists because more people apply for visas every year
than there are visas available. If there were no quota and visas were issued
according to market demand, then there would be no delay other than
processing. There would be little issue accommodating the future flow of
immigrants because such a system would not attempt to manage it. Visas
would simply be issued as qualifying people apply.116

However, an open borders policy is dead-on-arrival, politically
speaking.117 Moreover, there are important reasons to be skeptical of
open borders. If the immigration system’s sole purpose was to serve

25, 3 (1999)).
115. The Pew Research Center estimates there were 11 million undocumented immigrants in the
United States in 2015, while the Department of Homeland Security estimates that the figure is closer to
12 million. Compare Jeffrey S. Passel, Measuring Illegal Immigration: How Pew Research Center
Counts Unauthorized Immigrants in the U.S., PEW RES. CENTER (July 12, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/12/how-pew-research-center-counts-unauthorizedimmigrants-in-us/, with BRYAN BAKER, OFF. IMMIGR. STAT., POPULATION ESTIMATES (Dec. 2018).
Meanwhile, approximately 1.1 million immigrants become LPRs each year and about 4.7 million
applicants are currentlyon waiting lists. See RYAN BAUGH, OFF. IMMIGR. STAT., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT:
U.S. LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS (Oct. 2019); see also Bier, supra note 39.
116. Zachary J. Carls, Comment, American Immigration: A Path of Return to a Pre-Modern Ideal
of Open Immigration Policy, 7 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 187, 218-19 (2019). See also Alan O. Sykes,
The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey with an Analysis of U.S. Policy 2
(COASE-SANDOR INST. FOR L. & ECON., WORKING PAPER NO. 10,1992), available at
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/486e/14c83f773bdb8372236713a94ba532c7f959.pdf (“The curtailment
of the temporary workers program in the United States may have much to do with the growth of illegal
immigration. It is difficult to fashion a persuasive economic argument against an open door policy toward
temporary workers with employer sponsorship, and thus illegal immigration may be in large part the result
of economically unsound U.S. policies. . . . Absent an appropriate policy regarding the admission of
temporary workers, illegal immigration may be a ‘second best’ response to the resulting economic
inefficiencies.”); see also Gordon H. Hanson, The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN
REL.
33
(Apr.
2007),
https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2007/04/ImmigrationCSR26.pdf?_ga=2.262811212.198702938
8.1577413232-1782123223.1576985770 (“Keeping the number of visas fixed over time, as is the case
now, means that during boom times U.S. employers have a stronger incentive to seek out illegal labor.”).
117. Danielle Kurtzleben, What the Latest Immigration Polls Do (And Don’t) Say, NPR (Jan. 23,
2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/23/580037717/what-the-latest-immigration-polls-do-and-dont-say
(“Given the choice between ‘open borders’— a position that no mainstream political leaders are proposing
— and a ‘secure border,’ which is current U.S. policy, 79 percent of Americans agreed that the U.S. needs
‘secure borders.’”).
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economic ends, then perhaps an open border would be appropriate. But
Americans are likely willing to sacrifice some economic efficiency in
exchange for other perceived benefits, such as artificially inflating the
wages of American workers, or for more abstract principles, such as a
belief that limited immigration allows for greater assimilation.118 After
all, in a democracy, it is the people’s prerogative to put other policy
priorities above the supposed benefits of a completely unbridled,
uncontrolled free market.
Allowing states to craft their own visa programs, and to buy and sell
visas from one another, would introduce a measurable supply and demand
tool into the immigration system, creating at least some greater economic
efficiency, without completely eliminating room for American voters to
rank other values above the kind of efficient labor market that would
arguably emerge from an open-border reform. In this way, the proposal
is somewhat analogous to cap-and-trade proposals to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions:
Cap-and-trade . . . is designed to correct a market failure. In the absence
of the regulation of emissions, emitters do not pay the full social cost of
their activities; those costs are instead borne by those harmed by climate
change. By capping emissions at a level thought necessary to reduce the
effects of climate change and then distributing allowances to allow
emissions up to the amount of the cap, allowance prices should reflect the
marginal cost of abatement and emitters should find the means to reduce
emissions that fall below that cost.119

This Article’s proposal similarly strives to solve a market failure in the
current immigration system.120 Of course, a cap-and-trade system is
distinct in that it accepts as an essential precept that greenhouse gases are
bad and should be reduced. In the immigration context, by contrast,
Americans are sharply divided over whether immigration should be
reduced or increased.121 But even setting aside this dispute over goals,
cap-and-trade still provides important lessons for how this Article’s

118. For articles criticizing the concept of assimilation, see, e.g., Peter Skerry, Do We Really Want
Immigrants to Assimilate?, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 1, 2000), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/do-wereally-want-immigrants-to-assimilate/; Tom Gjelten, Should Immigration Require Assimilation?, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/should-immigrationrequire-assimilation/406759/; Glenn Llopis, Yet Another Call for Assimilation in America, but
Assimilation
to
What?,
FORBES
(Jan.
29,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/glennllopis/2019/01/29/yet-another-call-for-assimilation-in-america-butassimilation-to-what/#16fc84283e07.
119. Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-And-Trade and Complementary
Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 214 (2012).
120. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
121. Jones, supra note 1. For an explanation of why this proposal is likely to lead to an increase in
the total number of lawful immigrants, see infra Part IV(B)(1).
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proposal would work. The cap-and-trade system recognizes that, even if
most people generally agree that pollution should be reduced in the
abstract, they do not want it reduced in exactly the same way in every
industry or every community because the benefits of decreasing pollution
are outweighed in some situations by the costs of shutting down entire
factories or eliminating entire businesses. Cap-and-trade seeks to solve
that problem by quantifying, through market mechanisms, the costs and
benefits of allowing or limiting pollution in any given situation, rather
than focusing only on across-the-board decreases.
Similarly, people disagree as to whether immigration is a net cost or a
net benefit. Regardless of whether they are correct, the current system
provides no real outlet for expressing those beliefs through effective
policymaking. For example, many conservatives bemoan the costs and
dangers of immigration.122 But there has rarely been an opportunity for
conservatives to, for lack of a better phrase, put their money where their
mouth is and embrace the sort of stark, restrictionist policies they
endorse.123 And there is at least some reason to believe that, if put to the
test, Republican-led states would be more pro-immigrant than their
rhetoric sometimes suggests. In 2015, thirty Republican governors and
one Democratic governor issued symbolic, but powerless, statements
opposing the resettlement of Syrian refugees in their states.124 On
122. See, e.g., Matt O’Brien & Spencer Raley, The Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigration on United
States Taxpayers, FAIR (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.fairus.org/issue/publications-resources/fiscalburden-illegal-immigration-united-states-taxpayers; David Simcox, John L. Martin, & Rosemary Jenks,
The Costs of Immigration, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Sept. 1, 1994), https://cis.org/Report/CostsImmigration; Kristin Tate, Your Taxpayer Dollars are Footing the Spiraling Costs of Illegal Immigration,
THE HILL (Apr. 21, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/439930-your-taxpayer-dollars-arefooting-the-spiraling-costs-of-illegal-immigration.
For a few responses to the claim that immigration is a burden, see Alex Nowrasteh, FAIR’s”Fiscal Burden
of Illegal Immigration” Study is Fatally Flawed, CATO I NST. (Sept. 29, 2017),
https://www.cato.org/blog/fairs-fiscal-burden-illegal-immigration-study-fatally-flawed;
Miriam
Valverde, Do Immigrants Cost U.S. Taxpayers $300 Billion Annually?, POLITIFACT (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2018/jan/23/donald-trump/does-immigrationpolicy-impose-300-billion-annuall/.
123. Even President Trump’s anti-immigrant policies—however painful for individuals who have
borne the brunt of his actions—have had only modest impacts on the immigration system as whole. The
total number of deportations under President Trump were actually lower than under President Obama, his
efforts to build a border wall were mostly stymied by Congress and the courts, and his policies on refugees
and asylees—the area where he had the most unilateral discretion—affected only a small subset of the
total number of immigrants in the United States. See Zack Budryk, Deportations Lower Under Trump
Administration Than Obama: Report, THE HILL (Nov. 18, 2019), https://thehill.com/latino/470900deportations-lower-under-trump-than-obama-report); Miriam Valverde, Donald Trump’s Border Wall:
How Much Has Been Built?, POLITIFACT (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2019/aug/30/donald-trumps-border-wall-how-much-has-really-been/; see also text
accompanying supra note 32.
124. Ashley Fantz & Ben Brumfield, More than Half the Nation’s Governors Say Syrian Refugees
Not Welcome, CNN (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/11/16/world/paris-attacks-syrianrefugees-backlash/index.html.
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September 26, 2019, President Trump issued an executive order that
would have, for the first time, allowed states to block refugee
resettlement.125 But over the next four months, almost all states declined
to do so.126 In other words, while some politicians may have taken
rhetorical positions against refugees, few have been willing to actually
risk the political or economic consequences of excluding them entirely
when given the opportunity to do so.127
On the other hand, most liberals—though, as with conservatives, not
all—claim that immigration is beneficial, and have expressed a desire to
undertake greater state and local action to demonstrate that support. 128 As
with conservatives, there is at least some reason to believe liberal policies
may not match liberal rhetoric. It is worth noting, for example, that one
of the bulwarks of the Democratic Party in the United States—the labor
union movement—has been historically opposed to increased
immigration levels, and in some instances has even stymied
comprehensive immigration reform efforts.129 In any event, like

125. Exec. Order No. 13,888, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,355 (Sept. 26, 2019).
126. As of January 14, 2020, 42 governors, including 19 Republicans, had confirmed that they
intended to resettle refugees for the next year. Texas was the only state to announce it would reject
refugees. Nomaan Merchant, Texas Governor to Reject New Refugees, First Under Trump, AP (Jan. 14,
2020), https://apnews.com/7329dbc3dcbf32534689831455fa4246. The remaining seven governors
would have had until January 21, 2020, to decide whether to accept refugees, but on January 15, 2020, a
court enjoined enforcement of the executive order, mooting the issue. See HIAS, Inc. v. Trump, Civil No.
PJM 19-3346, 2020 WL 218646 (D. Md. Jan. 15, 2020). As of November 2020, that injunction remains
in effect pending an ongoing appeal. See HIAS, Inc. v. Trump, Appeal No. 20-1160 (4th Cir.) (docket last
reviewed Nov. 10, 2020).
127. See, e.g., Julie Watson & David Sharp, Trump Lets States, Cities Refuse Refugees for 1st Rime
in U.S., PBS (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/trump-lets-states-cities-refuserefugees-for-1st-time-in-u-s (discussing the economic benefits of refugees in North Dakota); Paighten
Harkins, Gov. Gary Herbert Wants More Refugees to Resettle in Utah, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2019/11/01/utah-governor-asks-trump/ (discussing a letter from the
Republican governor of Utah to the Trump Administration asking that additional refugees be settled in
Utah); John Hudak, Elaine Kamarck, & Christine Stenglein, Trump Threatened Sanctuary Cities, and
They
Shrugged—Here’s
Why,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(May
1,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2019/05/01/trump-threatened-sanctuary-cities-and-theyshrugged-heres-why/ (concluding that asylees “contributed $63 billion more in government revenues than
they cost.”).
128. For example, in mid-2019, President Trump stated, apparently as a threat, that he would begin
releasing detained undocumented immigrants into communities that identified as sanctuary cities.
Democratic mayors from Chicago, Seattle, and Philadelphia, among other places, all responded by saying
that they would welcome these immigrants into their communities. See Graham Vyse, Sanctuary City
Mayors Respond to Trump’s Threat ‘With Open Arms,’ GOVERNING (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-mayors-sanctuary-cities-trump.html.
129. Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 553-58 (2007)
(discussing the history of anti-immigrant sentiment among unions and recent moves away from those
positions); Julia Preston & Steven Greenhouse, Immigration Accord by Labor Boosts Obama Effort, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/us/14immig.html (discussing divisions
among organized labor regarding the proposed 2007 comprehensive immigration reform efforts, and
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conservatives, liberals are also mostly limited in their ability to act on
their stated support for increased immigration under the current system.130
Introducing a market for visas would put conservative and liberal
beliefs about immigration to the test because states would more directly
bear the costs of their decisions. States that view immigration either as a
moral good or an economic boon could purchase visas from other states
in order to direct more immigration to their communities. States opposed
to immigration could essentially put a price on their anti-immigrant
beliefs, preferring the certainty of cash to the more abstract (though likely
more sizeable) economic and cultural benefits of increased
immigration.131
In reality, under this Article’s proposal, no state is particularly likely to
engage in absolutist immigration policymaking. It would be financially
impossible for a pro-immigrant state to buy every visa from every other
state. At some point, other states would stop selling their visas, no matter
the price offered, because those states also want to see the benefits of
immigration. By the same token, even the least immigrant-friendly state
government would be unlikely to support a complete stop to immigration
to their state once they realize the economic consequences of such a
decision.
Most importantly, regardless of how absolutist any particular state
becomes in their immigration policies, as is true with free market systems
generally, the expectation is that supply and demand would allocate
immigrants more equitably throughout the country over time, in
proportion to the value—economic, moral, civic, or otherwise—that each
community places on immigration.132
IV. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS
Of course, significant pushback would be expected for such a largescale change to the U.S. immigration system. This final Part addresses
some of the most likely criticisms.

noting that while unions had agreed to support some reforms in 2009, they continued to oppose any
expansion of guestworker programs).
130. See, e.g., Clint Hendler, The ‘Sanctuary City’ Scam, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 6,
2007), https://archives.cjr.org/campaign_desk/the_sanctuary_city_scam.php (discussing how sanctuary
cities, one of the more common liberal reactions to the Trump Administration’s anti-immigrant policies,
are typically more symbolic than substantive).
131. See Nowrasteh, supra note 122; Valverde, supra note 122; Gretchen Frazee, 4 Myths About
How
Immigrants
Affect
the
U.S.
Economy,
PBS
(Nov.
2,
2018),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/4-myths-about-how-immigrants-affect-the-u-seconomy.
132. See supra note 84. For a discussion of whether this Article’s proposal would ultimately lead
to increased immigrant segregation, see infra Part IV(B)(2).
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Constitutionality of the Proposal

Perhaps the most important question facing this proposal is whether
devolving immigration powers to the states is even constitutional. After
all, for most of the last century, it has been widely accepted that the federal
government has unlimited and exclusive power over immigration
policy.133
Scholars have undertaken important work to challenge this premise. It
has become increasingly clear that, in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, states set their own immigration policies.134 But whatever the
merits of recognizing this history, it has had little bearing on judicial
interpretations of the federal immigration power in the modern era. As
recently as 2012, the Supreme Court reiterated that the federal
government “has broad, undoubted power over the subject of
immigration” and that the “federal power to determine immigration
policy is well settled.”135
This plenary federal power is often seen as the primary barrier to state
involvement in immigration policy,136 and this power raises at least three
constitutional questions regarding devolution. First, is such a delegation
even possible, given the federal government’s inherent sovereign powers
and the Constitution’s Naturalization clause? Second, even if it may be
devolved, how much discretion could states exercise over immigrant
admissions in light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment? Finally, would the delegation of powers to the states violate
the anti-commandeering doctrine?

133. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
134. Stumpf, supra note 9, at 1566-78; see also Ryan Terrence Chin, Comment, Moving Toward
Subfederal Involvement in Federal Immigration Law: Defining the Outsider, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1859,
1881-89 (2011) (explaining that before 1875, states, rather than the federal government, were primarily
responsible for enacting immigration statutes).
135. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394-95 (2012); but see id. at 419 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]n the first 100 years of the Republic, the States enacted numerous laws
restricting the immigration of certain classes of aliens, including convicted criminals, indigents, persons
with contagious diseases, and (in Southern States) freed blacks.”).
136. For example, several groups filed a lawsuit challenging President Trump’s executive order
permitting states to bar refugee resettlement in their jurisdiction. Among other things, the plaintiffs
asserted that “[t]he Executive Order and Defendants’ implementation of it seek to delegate to state and
local governments authority that the Constitution vested exclusively with the federal government.” See
Complaint, ¶¶ 144-145, Hias, Inc. v. Donald Trump, Case No. 8:19-cv-3346 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 2019). On
January 15, 2020, Judge Peter Messitte granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, finding
that they would most likely prevail in showing that the executive order violated existing law. HIAS, Inc.
v. Trump, Civil No. PJM 19-3346, 2020 WL 218646 (D. Md. Jan. 15, 2020). But notably, with respect
to the constitutional issues presented, Judge Messitte’s findings were limited to the issue of federal
preemption, which is consistent with the Supreme Court’s framing of the issue in Arizona v. United
States., 567 U.S. at399. See infra notes 144-146 and accompanying text. He did not suggest that the
Constitution inherently prohibited this type of delegation. Id.
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1. Federal Supremacy: Can Congress Devolve Its Immigration
Powers?
In 2001, Professor Michael Wishnie asserted that “the immigration
power is an exclusively federal one that Congress may not devolve by
statute to the states.”137 Professor Wishnie argued that this conclusion
was rooted in three constitutional provisions and one extra-constitutional
concept: (1) the Naturalization Clause, which states that “[t]he Congress
shall have Power . . . [t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”;138
(2) the Foreign Affairs Clauses, which vest the federal government with
the power to negotiate treaties and go to war;139 (3) the Foreign Commerce
Clause, which gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations”;140 and (4) the more abstract concept of national
sovereignty.141 Professor Wishnie argued that any devolution of
immigration power to the states would necessarily violate the uniformity
requirement of the Naturalization Clause, would set the states on collision
courses with foreign nations that disagreed with individual states’
immigration policies, and would dilute the sovereignty of the federal
government.142
But these concerns are generally overstated. The United States has a
long history of states enacting immigration provisions, which has posed
no apparent threat to foreign policy or federal sovereignty.143 And
Professor Peter J. Spiro has argued that, in today’s world, states already
exercise significant foreign policy powers:
Like it or not, state governments have become increasingly active on the
international stage. . . . State officials now have routine dealings with
foreign governments (both national and subnational) on cultural and
economic matters, and almost all have established trade and tourism offices
in various locations abroad. Dozens of state and local governments have
137. See Wishnie, supra note 10, at 497.
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations. . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“To declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water. . .
.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors”).
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
141. See Wishnie, supra note 10, at 532 n.209 (citing, among other sources, United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936), which held that “the investment of the federal government
with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.
The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations
with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the
federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.”).
142. Wishnie, supra note 10 at 533-35, 548-52.
143. See Stumpf, supra note 9; Chin, supra note 134.
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in recent years taken formal action, evidently motivated by traditional
foreign policy concerns. These developments appear irreversible, at least
in the short run. The federal government can no longer perform the
function of the gatekeeper between domestic and international realms as
breaches in the wall between the two inescapably widen. The notion that
the federal government now has or will any time soon restore a monopoly
over U.S. foreign relations is a fiction[.]144

Importantly, nothing about the Supreme Court’s handling of
immigration cases suggests it would agree with Professor Wishnie’s
position. In Arizona v. United States, one of the Supreme Court’s most
important immigration decisions in decades, the majority held that certain
Arizona immigration laws were preempted by federal law.145 Although
the court struck down Arizona’s laws, it did so based on their apparent
conflict with federal laws enacted by Congress, rather than by invoking
more general Constitutional limitations.146
In Arizona v. United States, the Court began by recounting familiar
preemption principles: (1) that “Congress may withdraw specified powers
from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption
provision”; (2) that state law may be displaced by “a framework of
regulation ‘so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it’ or where there is a ‘federal interest . . . so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject’”; and (3) that state laws “are preempted when they
conflict with federal law.”147 None of these principles would prevent
Congress from delegating immigrant admission decisions to the states. If
Congress did so, it would not be expressly preempting state conduct and
it would not be regulating an area so pervasively as to prevent state
conduct. It would, in fact, be doing the exact opposite by allowing states
to regulate in that field. And although immigration policy generally
appears to be a “federal interest so dominant” that preemption might
otherwise be “assumed,” it would be much harder for a court to make that
assumption if Congress affirmatively passed legislation to delegate some
of its immigration powers. Finally, as with all interactions between the
federal government and the states, it would be up to the states to pass laws
that fell within the parameters permitted by the federal government; any
law beyond that would be subject to normal federal preemption analysis.
Justice Scalia’s partial concurrence in Arizona goes even further,
arguing at length that states have a sovereign right to be involved in
144. Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L
L. 121, 161-62 (1994).
145. Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012).
146. Id. at 398-400.
147. Id. at 399.
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immigration decisions.
Justice Scalia acknowledged that “state
regulation is excluded by the Constitution when (1) it has been prohibited
by a valid federal law, or (2) it conflicts with federal regulation—when,
for example, it admits those whom federal regulation would exclude, or
excludes those whom federal regulation would admit.”148 But it follows,
under this logic, that if the federal government delegated to the states the
power to make admission decisions, states exercising that power would
not be “admit[ting] those whom federal regulation would exclude.”
Relatedly, Justice Thomas has noted that the most straightforward
reading of the Naturalization Clause is that it allows, but does not
mandate, Congress to create a uniform rule of naturalization. In other
words, Congress is free to depart from the rule of uniformity and allow
the states to create variable naturalization schemes:
Even after the Constitution gave Congress the power to “establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . throughout the United States,” Art. I, §
8, cl. 4, Congress was under no obligation to do so, and the Framers surely
expected state law to continue in full force unless and until Congress acted.
...
Even when Congress enacted the first federal naturalization law in 1790, it
left open the possibility that the individual States could establish more
lenient standards of their own for admitting people to citizenship. While
Hamilton had suggested that Congress’ power to “establish an Uniform
Rule” logically precluded the States from deviating downward from the
rule that Congress established, see The Federalist No. 32, at 199, the early
cases on this question took the opposite view. See Collet v. Collet, 2 Dall.
294, 296, 1 L.Ed. 387 (CC Pa. 1792) (Wilson, Blair, and Peters, JJ.). States
therefore continued to enact naturalization laws of their own until 1795,
when Congress passed an exclusive naturalization law. See J. Kettner,
Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870, pp. 242-243 (1978).149

In sum, the relevant case law supports the conclusion that immigrant
admission powers could be constitutionally delegated to the states.
2.

The Equal Protection Clause: How Much Discretion Would States
Have to Exercise Immigration Powers?

In many ways, the more difficult question concerns the level of
discretion states would have in crafting their visa programs, assuming
Congress decided to delegate immigrant admission powers to them.
There has been a sharp divide between state courts and federal courts on

148. Id. at 422 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 872, 872 n.13 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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this question, and for this Article’s proposal to work, it would almost
certainly be necessary for the Supreme Court to ultimately come down on
the side of the federal courts.
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court held that the federal government was
permitted to discriminate against different classes of aliens (for example,
based on their length of residency in the United States) so long as the
discriminatory law could survive rational basis review; by contrast, states
could discriminate on the basis of alienage only if their discriminatory
laws were able to survive strict scrutiny.150 This different treatment arose
from the fact that, when reviewing federal laws, the Supreme Court had
to balance the intrinsic federal power over immigration against the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, while only the Equal
Protection Clause was relevant when it reviewed state laws.151
But what if the states were authorized to engage in such discrimination
by the federal government? In Graham v. Richardson, which first
subjected state policies to strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court explicitly
warned in dicta that, because of the Naturalization Clause, “[a]
congressional enactment construed so as to permit state legislatures to
adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for
federally supported welfare programs would appear to contravene this
explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity.”152 However, the
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Mathews v. Diaz153 complicated
things by concluding that federal immigration laws would only be subject
to rational basis review. At least one scholar (and several courts) have
concluded that, under Mathews, if “the states are carrying out an explicit
congressional policy,” then “the resulting classifications should be seen
as incidents of federal policy, not state policy, and should thus receive
rational basis review.”154
The Supreme Court has never resolved the tension between Graham
and Mathews. Nevertheless, the issue was litigated in state courts and the
federal circuit courts following the enactment of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”)
in 1996.
150. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976).
151. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84-85.
152. Graham, 402 U.S. at 382.
153. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 82-86.
154. Developments in the Law—Jobs and Borders, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2247, 2253 (2005); see also
id. at 2267 (“If the immigration power is rooted in the nation’s inherent sovereign powers, the case for a
congressional power to delegate is even stronger. Congress should be able, in the exercise of inherent
sovereign powers, to authorize states to classify on the basis of alienage in whatever manner they
choose.”). See also Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) and Korab v. Fink, 797
F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2014).
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Among other things, PRWORA authorized states to limit the classes of
immigrants that could receive benefits from certain federal welfare
programs.155 Many states responded by imposing limitations on the
availability of welfare for immigrants. State courts in New York,
Arizona, and Massachusetts struck down these limitations.156 Each of the
courts held that, notwithstanding Congress’s delegation of power to the
states in PRWORA, Graham was still the appropriate rule. In other
words, each state’s laws permitting some, but not all, immigrants to
receive welfare benefits were subject to strict scrutiny, and in each case,
the laws were struck down on the ground that the states were
unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of alienage.
If the rule from these three state courts was applied to this Article’s
proposal, states would be significantly inhibited from creating their own
visa regimes. At least hypothetically, an immigrant already legally living
in the United States under a temporary visa—and who is therefore
covered by the Equal Protection Clause157—could argue that any policy
granting a permanent visa to a new immigrant from abroad, rather than to
the immigrant already present, would have to be defended under strict
scrutiny. True, states might be able to satisfy that burden in some
exceptional cases. A state could show, for example, that it had a
compelling interest in admitting a refugee from a life-threatening danger,
and that the least restrictive means of accomplishing that goal was to grant
the refugee a permanent visa, even though that meant no permanent visa
was available for a student or a guestworker on a temporary visa already
living in the United States. However, the need to justify each policy under
strict scrutiny would still dramatically limit states’ abilities to experiment
with programs unique to their respective needs. Suddenly, courts would
be called on to second-guess every visa issued, and the benefits of the
program—democratic accountability, innovation, market efficiency—
would mostly vanish.
Luckily, this is not the only, or even the most likely, possible outcome.
Federal courts have also addressed PRWORA and have explicitly
disagreed with these state court cases, concluding instead that state laws
enacted under PRWORA were only subject to rational basis review. In
Soskin v. Reinertson, the Tenth Circuit concluded that PRWORA
reflected a “national policy that Congress has the constitutional power to
enact” and that “a state’s exercise of discretion [under PRWORA] can

155. See Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611-1613.
156. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001), Kurti v. Maricopa Cnty., 33 P.3d 499 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2001), and Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Authority, 959 N.E.2d 970 (Mass.
2012).
157. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-13 (1982).
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also effectuate national policy.”158 This meant that the rational basis
deference generally afforded federal alienage laws extended to the states
as well.159 The Ninth Circuit later endorsed the same reading in Korab v.
Fink.160
These cases are not, by themselves, a guarantee that rational basis
review would be extended to the states if this proposal was adopted. Most
troublingly, the Tenth Circuit’s decision was based, at least in part, on the
fact that PRWORA had “no direct relationship to the naturalization
process” because it was limited to welfare benefit decisions.161 This
Article’s proposal, by contrast, is much more closely related to
naturalization: the permanent visas issued by the states would entitle
recipients to LPR status and, ultimately, citizenship.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that courts evaluating this
Article’s proposal would reach the same result as the Soskin and Korab
courts. Even under the existing immigration regime, states play a
significant role in determining whether an immigrant obtains the benefits
of naturalization. For example, when marriage is relevant to determining
admissibility, the United States looks to whether “the qualifying marriage
was entered into in accordance with the laws of the place where the
marriage took place.”162 Different marital requirements in different states
(such as the existence of common law marriage) can therefore affect an
individual’s eligibility for a permanent visa. Additionally, certain
juvenile immigrants may become LPRs if they have “been declared
dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States . . . [and]
reunification with [one] or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable
due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State
law.”163 Yet the ability of juveniles to invoke this provision varies widely
depending on their state of residence.164 Finally, courts have held that an
individual can be deported for violating a criminal statute even if the same
conduct is legal in a neighboring jurisdiction. 165 In short, “while
immigration law is often described as the archetypical uniform national

158. Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004).
159. Id.
160. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2014).
161. Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256.
162. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i)(I).
163. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).
164. Compare In re S.A.R.D., 182 So.3d 897 (Fla. 2016) (interpreting the Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status laws narrowly) with Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 423 P.3d 334 (Cal. 2018) (interpreting
the same laws expansively). State approaches to the Special Immigrant Juvenile Status provisions vary
widely; some state courts have gone so far as to refuse to participate in the process altogether. For a
summary of the positions taken by various states, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Juarez v. Ky. Cabinet
for Health & Family Servs. (2019) No. 19-638.
165. Petition of Lee Wee, 143 F. Supp. 736 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
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policy—the federal government often claims in court that its power to
regulate migration comes from Congress’s authority to create a ‘uniform
rule of naturalization’—immigration law in practice varies from state to
state.”166
The Ninth Circuit has recognized this dichotomy:
In Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 22 S.Ct. 857, 46 L.Ed.
1113 (1902), the Court considered a challenge to the 1898 Bankruptcy Act
on the ground that its incorporation of divergent state laws failed to
“establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies” and
unconstitutionally “delegate[d] certain legislative powers to the several
states.” Id. at 183, 22 S.Ct. 857. The Court held that the incorporation of
state laws “is, in the constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United
States” because the “general operation of the law is uniform although it
may result in certain particulars differently in different states.” Id. at 190,
22 S.Ct. 857.
The principle that “uniformity does not require the elimination of any
differences among the States” has equal traction here [in the immigration
context]. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469, 102 S.Ct.
1169, 71 L.Ed.2d 335 (1982). As in the bankruptcy context, although the
“particulars” are different in different states, the basic operation of
[PRWORA] is uniform throughout the United States. Stellwagen v. Clum,
245 U.S. 605, 613, 38 S.Ct. 215, 62 L.Ed. 507 (1918) (holding that
bankruptcy law may be uniform and yet “may recognize the laws of the
state in certain particulars, although such recognition may lead to different
results in different states”).167

It is therefore reasonable to conclude that a national scheme by
Congress to delegate immigrant admission powers to the states would be
constitutional and would allow states to adopt visa regimes that (as
expressions of federal policy) would be subject to rational basis review,
the same standard applied to admission decisions made by the federal
government itself. This would allow states the maximum level of
flexibility necessary to create visa regimes that meet the needs of each
particular state.

166. Cox & Posner, supra note 54, at 1332 (footnote omitted); see also Leticia M. Saucedo, States
of Desire: How Immigration Law Allows States to Attract Desired Immigrants, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
471, 473-74 (2018) (“[O]ver the past thirty years, Congress increasingly has devolved considerable
authority to states over decisions that affect immigration regulation. . . . Congress has granted power to
the states to define and identify key terms of the immigration statute in areas where the states traditionally
hold such powers (licensing, criminal law, and family regulation, for example).”).
167. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 581-82 (9th Cir. 2014). See also Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415,
429 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Constitution simply requires Congress to enact rules of naturalization that
apply uniformly throughout the United States, even though those uniform federal rules may produce
results that differ by state.”).
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Impact of the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine

Although federal supremacy and equal protection are the greatest
constitutional threats to this Article’s proposal, the anti-commandeering
doctrine must also be briefly addressed.
The Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional for “federal
legislation [to] commandeer[] a State’s legislative or administrative
apparatus for federal purposes.”168 Davon Collins, in proposing a
narrower delegation program in which states could issue temporary
employment visas, expressed concern about whether state-based visas
would run afoul of the anti-commandeering doctrine.169 He sought to
obviate this issue by emphasizing that his program was voluntary: only
states that wanted to participate would do so, and the federal government
would not force any state to be involved.170
This Article’s proposal is less voluntary than Mr. Collins’ proposal in
that all states would automatically receive a distribution of visas. But it
is unlikely to raise any commandeering concerns because no state would
actually be forced to issue visas or otherwise build up an immigrant
admissions infrastructure. A state could instead sell all of its visas, if it
wanted, or it could simply let them go unused, leading to their expiration
at the end of the year. Accordingly, the federal government would not be
forcing the states to engage in any immigration functions against their
will.171
Nor should state officials who become responsible for administering
the system be seen as state officials doing federal work. Again, creating
an application system, vetting applicants, and forwarding requests to the
State Department to issue travel permits, would all be undertaken by the
states only if they chose to do so. State officials involved in this work
would no more be doing federal work than the county clerk or justice of
the peace that performed a marriage between a U.S. citizen and a foreign
national, or the police officer, district attorney, and state court judge who
caused an immigrant to be found guilty of a crime, even though such
conduct has direct consequences on an individual’s ability to obtain a

168. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012).
169. See Collins, supra note 12, at 369.
170. Id.
171. Somewhat analogously, in response to the Special Juvenile Immigrant Status program, which
instructs state courts to make findings relevant to juvenile immigrant applications (see text accompanying
supra note 162), some state courts have simply declined to make the requested findings, on the ground
only the state legislatures, not Congress, can provide them with the jurisdiction to engage in such work.
See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 162; see also Canales v. Torres Orellana, 800
S.E.2d 208, 217 (Va. Ct. App. 2017) (en banc); de Rubio v. Rubio Herrera, 541 S.W.3d 564 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2017); Commonwealth v. N.B.D., 577 S.W.3d 73 (Ky. 2019).
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visa.172
Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above, this Article’s proposal
would most likely pass constitutional muster.
B.

Political Impediments

Of course, whether a given proposal is constitutional ultimately has
very little to do with whether it is good policy. This Subpart therefore
addresses the three most difficult political questions likely to be raised by
this Article’s proposal.
1.

Would the Proposal Increase or Decrease the Total Number of
Legal Immigrants to the United States?

In theory, this Article’s proposal is disconnected from the question of
how many immigrants America should accept each year. Congress could
double the number of visas and then let states distribute them; or Congress
could slash the number of visas in half and then let states distribute those
visas. Either way, devolution to the states would be valuable because of
the increased opportunities for experimentation, greater democratic
accountability for the policies created, and a distribution of immigrants
throughout the country that better reflects the will of local political
communities.
That said, realistically, the politicians tasked with enacting this
proposal are likely to be most interested in whether the proposal would
lead to increased or decreased immigration.
i. Possible Short-Term Decreases
If this Article’s proposal were enacted, it is at least plausible that, in
the short-term, the total number of immigrants coming to the United
States would decrease.
First, there currently is no cap on the number of visas available for
several categories, including immediate family members, temporary
farmworkers, and students. Instead, the number of visas for those
categories is capped only by the number of individuals who qualify.173 In
172. Similarly, Julia Jagow has argued that giving states additional power to regulate guestworker
visas would be no different than delegating to states oversight over Medicaid and certain Clean Air Act
emissions standards. See Jagow, supra note 12. But for a contrasting view, see States’ Commandeered
Convictions, supra note 9 (contending that using state convictions as a basis for deportation violates anticommandeering principles).
173. That is not to say these categories are totally disconnected from the cap system. Often, the
number of visas issued for one category can lead to a decrease in the number of visas issued in a different
category. See KANDEL, supra note 23.
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order to transition to a system where states are in charge of issuing visas,
and where states can adjust the types and qualifications of each visa, such
open-ended categories would need to be eliminated. Instead, there would
need to be a specific, total number of permanent visas and a specific, total
number of months for temporary visas available each year across all
categories.
In establishing this total number, Congress could theoretically take the
opportunity to increase the levels of legal immigration, as has repeatedly
been proposed.174 For example, the number of permanent visas could be
set at 1,266,129, which is the largest number of permanent visas issued in
any one year in the last two decades.175 However, it would likely be more
politically palatable to set the number at about 1,050,000, which is close
to the average number of visas issued over the last twenty years.176
Adopting an average would mean that it is less than the number admitted
in certain years, leading to a short-term decrease in the number of legal
immigrants. On the other hand, the use of an average also means that the
number of admitted immigrants is higher than the number admitted in
other years; and over the long-term, the total number of immigrants
admitted would be the same as if no cap had been introduced.
Second, there is a risk that certain states would simply refuse to issue
the visas allocated to them, leading to a net decrease in the number of
immigrants entering the United States each year, even if the number of
available visas was the same.
While this possibility cannot be completely dismissed, it should be
viewed skeptically. As an initial matter, states that are opposed to
increased levels of immigration would be able to profit by selling their
visas to other states. Given this incentive, it seems far more likely that
states would sell visas, allowing them to be used elsewhere, rather than
simply sit on visas and let them expire out of a pique of anti-immigrant
sentiment. Moreover, even if there were states that occasionally insisted
on neither issuing nor selling their share of the visas, a good reallocation
system would prevent any one state from having an outsized impact for
more than a few years. As noted above, this Article does not take a
position on how the visas should be allocated each year—by total
population, by economic size, by history of immigration, or by some other
metric. However, under almost any system, states that consistently refuse
to issue or sell their visas would eventually receive a smaller and smaller
share of visas to distribute at the outset of each new year.177 The result is
174. See supra note 35.
175. See YEARBOOK, supra note 24.
176. Id. Similarly, the number of months available for temporary visas would ideally be calculated
based on the number of temporary visas issued over the last few years.
177. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. A system that allocates exactly the same
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that no one state, by itself, would have the power to create a long-term
decrease in immigration levels.
Finally, it is worth reiterating that anti-immigration sentiment at the
state level might still be preferable to anti-immigration sentiment at the
federal level. Setting caps on all visas may seem to bode ill for
immigration rates, but there would also be some political benefits to that
decision. For example, since the decision to admit refugees would be
made by the states, this Article’s proposal would prevent an antiimmigration president from unilaterally and dramatically reducing the
annual number of refugees admitted, since that decision would instead by
made by the states.178 And members of Congress would feel less pressure
from anti-immigrant constituents to limit immigration nationally if those
same constituents were able to limit immigration at the state level:
By allowing the states individually to let off their steam, however scalding
it may be, the nation need not visit the same sins. . . . It is plausible that
greater state-level discretion could help build a more durable foundation
for a more consistently benign federal posture toward aliens, their
admission, and their legal status relative to the citizenry.179

Thus, at least arguably, the risks of certain states seeking to reduce the
total number of immigrants may still be preferable to the current system.
ii. Likely Long-Term Increases
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is likely this Article’s proposal would
lead to a long-term increase in the total number of legal visas authorized
each year. By creating a market-based distribution system for visas, states
that desire increased immigration will be able to get it by purchasing visas
from states that do not want a growing immigrant population. If some
states want more visas, even after having exhausted their ability to
purchase visas from other states—a likely assumption, given the current
demand for immigration180—it would be politically easier for their
senators and representatives to convince their more recalcitrant
colleagues to oblige them. Senators and representatives from states that
are opposed to increased immigration could justify supporting an increase
in the number of visas by reassuring their constituents—or themselves—

number of visas to each state, regardless of size or other factors, is the one exception. Under that system,
a state that refused to either issue or sell its visas could independently cause an overall decrease in
immigration rates to the United States. But as discussed above, see supra note 84, such a system would
be an exceedingly inefficient allocation, and so should be avoided even apart from the possible
ramifications such a distribution would have on net immigration levels.
178. See Allyn, supra note 31.
179. Spiro, supra note 143, at 173-74.
180. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
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that their state would have a direct financial interest in allowing for more
visas (because their share of the visas could be sold), without actually
risking any influx of new immigrants to their own state.181
Accordingly, although there may be legitimate concerns that setting a
total cap on the number of visas and allowing states a say in immigrantadmission decisions would lead to a decrease in the number of immigrants
to the United States, in the long-term, this proposal could provide the
political environment necessary for Congress to increase the number of
visas available annually.
iii. Fluctuations Due to Increased Bureaucracy
The above concerns are focused on government conduct: how high a
cap Congress will set and how aggressively states will pursue proimmigrant or anti-immigrant policies. A separate question relates to
immigrants themselves. Those in favor of increased immigration could
be reasonably concerned that a new, fifty-state visa system would impose
such an increase of bureaucratic burdens that would-be immigrants could
become discouraged from applying at all. Immigrants with family
members in multiple states or job offers in different markets could be
forced to do more paperwork to apply for a visa in each of those states,
rather than through the unified federal system that exists presently. And
to the extent that one state’s system is vastly different from other states,
the added confusion could be foreboding.
This is a legitimate concern, but its effect would most likely be
marginal. After all, immigrants already navigate complex, competing
systems to obtain visas. Prospective students, for example, must apply to
numerous universities before ever beginning the immigration process.182
Yet every year, hundreds of thousands of immigrants successfully make
it through this process. And of course, the same is true in the employment
context. As with applying for school, it can be confusing and exhausting
181. Economic data shows that even though LPRs may theoretically move anywhere in the United
States, they rarely do so. In 2018, only 2.3% of noncitizen immigrants moved from one state to another.
The statistics for immigrants that have become U.S. citizens were even lower: just 1.5% moved from one
state to another. By contrast, about 2.4% of native-born citizens moved from one state to another in 2018.
A spreadsheet summarizing this data is in the possession of the author and may be reviewed upon request.
For the raw data, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE B07007: GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY IN THE PAST
YEAR BY CITIZENSHIP STATUS FOR CURRENT RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2019), available at
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=b07007&g=0100000US&tid=ACSDT1Y2019.B07007&hidePrev
iew=true.
182. See Chester & Cully, supra note 20, at 395 (“To begin the process of obtaining an F-1
Nonimmigrant Student Visa, the student must first apply to a USCIS-approved U.S. academic institution.
Upon acceptance, there is a long checklist that the alien student must complete which includes, inter alia,
obtaining a Certificate of Eligibility from the school, payment of fees, completion of the visa application
itself, and assembling important documents such as birth certificate, transcripts, and passport.”).
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to apply to numerous companies before finally obtaining a job, yet this is
a necessary prerequisite to obtaining an employment visa.183
In short, concerns about increased bureaucracy are understandable but
not so serious as to doom this proposal. Delegating powers to the states
might create an added burden for immigrants who must navigate multiple
states’ application and approval processes. But these added costs are, on
the whole, likely to be relatively minor. The federal government already
delegates significant aspects of the immigration system to employers,
sponsoring family members, schools, religious institutions, refugee
resettlement agencies, and even the states. 184 Despite these hurdles,
immigrants have successfully managed this balkanized system in the past.
The creation of state-based visas is unlikely to significantly exacerbate
the already existing problems of bureaucracy, and therefore is unlikely to
lead to any decrease in the total number of foreign nationals seeking to
enter the United States each year.
2.

Would the Proposal Increase or Decrease Immigrant Segregation?

Under this proposal, pro-immigrant states would be likely to purchase
an increasing share of visas, and once immigrants arrive in a particular
state, they are likely to stay there. 185 Accordingly, this proposal has the
potential to increase the immigrant populations of certain pro-immigrant
states while other states stagnate, leading to increasingly segregated
immigrant communities.
This risk of increased segregation has been identified as one of the key
reasons not to allow state involvement in immigration decisions. As one
commentator has noted:
[A]llowing states to engage in experiments that either welcome or repel
immigrants threatens to undermine national cohesion in a number of ways.
. . . [S]tate immigration laws generate three separate divisions that fall
along racial and ethnic lines: (1) profiling and selective enforcement; (2)
the actual movement of immigrants, most of whom are Latino, away from
restrictionist states; and (3) public attitudes about these trends. These
developments threaten to shake loose the nation’s basic conception of a
shared identity.186

183. While the immigrant is responsible for finding a job, once a position is secured, it is the
prospective employer, not the immigrant, who takes the lead in working through the visa application
system. Id. at 391 (“Forms detailing the position and salary, as well as information regarding salaries of
U.S. employees in similar positions, and any necessary fees are submitted to USCIS by the employer, not
by the potential employee.”).
184. Cox & Posner, supra note 54.
185. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 179.
186. See Cunningham-Parmeter supra note 10, at 1720-21; see also Wishnie, supra note 10
(warning that devolution will necessarily lead to increased anti-immigrant discrimination); Burch Elias,
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But there are reasons to be skeptical of this conclusion. First,
immigrants are already segregated: most immigrants have sorted
themselves into just a few corners of the country.187 This proposal may
bring some light to this already-existing structure, as some states seek an
increasing share of the visas and others sell their visas off, but it is
unlikely to dramatically exacerbate the problem. On the contrary,
immigration to historically underrepresented regions might actually
increase if states decide to create visa programs that are explicitly
designed to entice immigrants to settle in depopulating areas.188
Second, it is not necessarily apparent that this type of sorting is as big
a threat to social cohesion as some suggest. Professor Cristina Rodríguez,
for example, has noted that:
[T]he processes of absorbing [immigrants] into the body politic may
ultimately benefit from a bit of regulatory competition or from population
sorting in which immigrants settle in welcoming communities. Such
competition might make for better integration in the long run: immigrants,
like citizens, will sort themselves out, settling where they are more likely
to fit in and be welcomed into public institutions.189

For these reasons, if immigrant admission powers were devolved the
states, an increase in immigrant segregation would be unlikely to occur.
And even if it did occur, it would not necessarily be a cause for concern.
3.

The Question of Amnesty

Finally, another benefit of this Article’s proposal is that states could
choose whether to provide a permanent visa—and, eventually, the
citizenship that follows—to undocumented immigrants already in the
country.190 But as this would likely be a particularly politically-charged
supra note 11, at 407 (warning that, if states were allowed a greater say in refugee resettlement, “it is all
too easy to imagine lawmakers seeking to appeal to voters by engaging in ever more draconian measures
against vulnerable asylee and refugee populations in their states”).
187. Of the 22 million noncitizen immigrants living in the United States in 2018, 54% lived in just
four states: California, Texas, Florida, and New York. In comparison, those same four states represent
just 33% of the total U.S. population. In fact, 80% of non-citizen immigrants live in just 14 states, and
90% live in just 23 states. Again, for comparison, those states represent 61% and 79% of the total U.S.
population, respectively. Perhaps even more shockingly, 51% of noncitizen immigrants live in just eight
metropolitan areas: New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami, Houston, Chicago, Dallas, and
Washington, D.C. Together, these cities only represent about 28% of the total U.S. population. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 179.
188. See Mathema, Svajlenka & Hermann, supra note 88; See also Jagow, supra note 12, at 1292
(noting that Canada’s “Provincial Nominee Program has proved essential because it helps to spread out
the benefits of immigration to all provinces and territories instead of just to major cities, like Toronto,
Montreal and Vancouver.”).
189. Rodríguez, supra note 11, at 639.
190. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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issue, it is worth briefly examining in more detail how that would work.
Even under this proposal, it is expected that the federal government
would continue to be responsible for running background checks on those
to whom the states have decided to issue visas.191 This raises a difficult
question as to whether an individual unlawfully in the United States could
pass such a background check.
Congress would almost certainly have to deal with this issue in the
same legislation used to create this new program. It could do so in several
ways. First, to make this Article’s proposal as effective as possible,
Congress could expressly legislate that an unlawful crossing or visa
overstay, by itself, would not be enough to deny a subsequent permanent
visa to an immigrant if that immigrant has otherwise been approved for a
visa by a state. In other words, entering or remaining in the United States
without a visa would still be illegal, and an undocumented immigrant
could still be deported by the United States if they are unable to obtain a
visa from any of the states, but a state could provide visas and a path to
citizenship to undocumented immigrants if it wanted to, without
interference from the federal government.
Alternatively, Congress could provide discretion to federal officials
within the Department of Homeland Security to decide, on a case-by-case
or class-by-class basis, whether undocumented applicants should pass
their background checks. This raises significant concerns about arbitrary
decision-making at the federal level, but may be more politically palatable
to a federal government that is often hesitant—if not downright
resistant—to divesting itself of its own power. Under this scenario, one
presidential administration could permit certain favorable classes of
undocumented immigrants (agricultural workers, Dreamers, or foreign
students graduating from U.S. colleges, for example) to pass their
background checks and obtain permanent visas from a state that
authorized visas to such individuals, while still vetoing permanent
immigration status for other undocumented immigrants, regardless of the
willingness of certain states to authorize permanent visas for those
individuals. A later presidential administration, on the other hand, could
reverse course and prohibit any undocumented immigrants from
obtaining a permanent visa, regardless of the desires of individual states.
Although far from ideal, this would still be a big step forward from the
status quo, in which some eleven million people are living in an endless
legal limbo, because it would at least allow for the possibility of
occasional relief for some subset of the undocumented population.192
Third, Congress could of course delegate immigrant admission powers

191. See supra note 94.
192. See supra note 115.
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to the states while simply prohibiting them from providing any permanent
visas to undocumented immigrants.193 While this would leave the biggest
immigration issue in the United States unresolved, this Article’s proposal
would still be valuable even if political realities meant that states were
prevented from engaging in any conduct that resembled an amnesty
program. After all, this proposal is most likely, in the long-term, to lead
to higher levels of legal immigration, which is itself a partial solution to
the problem of illegal border crossings and visa overstays.194 In other
words, the benefits of the proposal do not live or die on the question of a
path to legal citizenship.
CONCLUSION
The United States immigration system is “broken.” Or, at least, so says
Donald Trump,195 Barack Obama,196 George W. Bush,197 Hillary
Clinton,198 Mitt Romney,199 John McCain,200 Nancy Pelosi,201 and Paul
Ryan,202 to name just a few bipartisan critics of the status quo.
Acknowledging the problem over and over again, however, has not led
to any concrete reforms, even though many possible solutions—or, at
least, plausible ideas worth trying—exist. If the political will to enact

193. Even if this were the case, one would hope Congress would still allow states to provide
temporary visas (which come with no possibility of citizenship) for undocumented immigrants, as two
recent proposals have called for. See Agricultural Guestworker Act, H.R. 4092, 115th Cong. (2018); Farm
Workforce Modernization Act, H.R. 5038, 116th Cong. (2019).
194. See supra note 116.
195. President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-union-address/.
196. President Barack Obama’s State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 28, 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-stateunion-address.
197. N.Y. Times, George W. Bush on Immigration: ‘The System Is Broken’, YOUTUBE (Jul. 10,
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flWaojCCqXA.
198. Immigration Reform, HILLARY CLINTON, https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/immigrationreform/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2020).
199. Ezra Klein, Mitt Romney’s Immigration Plan: The Full Text, WASH. POST (June 22, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/06/22/mitt-romneys-immigration-plan-the-fulltext/.
200. John McCain, U.S. Sen. John McCain: Will Support Policies to Grow the Economy and
Alleviate Some Financial Strain on Arizona Families, TUCSON.COM (Jan. 6, 2013),
https://tucson.com/news/opinion/jobs-gun-violence-immigration-top-agenda-for-our-senatorsrepresentatives/article_f80445b2-3819-56f5-9d10-7f812f1e408c.html.
201. Bloomberg Businessweek, Pelosi ‘Not Giving Up Hope’ on Immigration Overhaul,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2014-12-04/pelosi-not-givingup-hope-on-immigration-overhaul-video.
202. Sandra McElwaine, Immigration’s Odd Couple: Two Puerto Rican Congressmen Forge a
Deal, THE DAILY BEAST (Jul. 11, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/immigrations-odd-couple-twopuerto-rican-congressmen-forge-a-deal.
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such changes cannot be found at the federal level, states should be given
an opportunity to step into the breach. After all, “[i]t is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”203 By devolving
immigrant admission powers to the states, paralyzed politicians could
finally find their way out of the immigration labyrinth, and could finally
cut the Gordian knot that is the modern U.S. immigration regime.

203. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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